37/50/Add.2 Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on his mission to Turkey: comments by the State
Document Type: Final Report
Date: 2017 Dec
Session: 37th Regular Session (2018 Feb)
Agenda Item: Item3: Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development
GE.17-23047(E)
Human Rights Council Thirty-seventh session
26 February-23 March 2018
Agenda item 3
Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights,
including the right to development
Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on his mission to Turkey: comments by the State*
* Reproduced as received.
United Nations A/HRC/37/50/Add.2
General Assembly Distr.: General 21 December 2017
English only
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1. The Government of the Republic of Turkey expresses its appreciation of the role
played by mandate of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment on examining questions relevant to torture. Turkey
takes note of the contributions of the Rapporteur’s work in fulfilling his mission within the
scope of his mandate to date.
2. After studying the advanced unedited version of the Report which was prepared by
the Special Rapporteur’s Office, following his mission to Turkey from 27 November
through 2 December 2016, the Government of the Republic of Turkey would like to submit
its comments and observations in the following paragraphs.
Terrorist Organization FETÖ/PDY
3. To start with, the Government wishes to remind that FETÖ/PDY (Fetullahist
Terrorist Organization/Parallel State Structure) is an armed terrorist organization
established by Fetullah Gülen which aims to suppress, debilitate and direct all the
Constitutional institutions, to overthrow the Government of the Republic of Turkey and to
establish an oppressive and totalitarian system through resorting to force, violence, threat,
blackmailing and other unlawful means.
4. On the night of 15 July, upon the instruction of the founder and leader of the
FETÖ/PDY, Fetullah Gülen, and in line with the plan approved by him, “a group of
terrorists in uniforms” within the Turkish Armed Forces attempted an armed coup against
the democracy for the purpose of overthrowing the elected president, Parliament and
Government together with the Constitutional order.
5. The Presidential Compound, the hotel where Mr. President was staying at, the
Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), the Police Special Operations Centre and the
security units, the premises of the National Intelligence Organization and various military
units were attacked with bombs and arms. The Bosphorus bridges connecting Asia and
Europe were closed to traffic by the terrorists in uniform using tanks and heavy artillery.
6. The Turkish Parliament building, reflecting the public’s will and the heart of the
democracy, was bombed for the first time in the history of the Republic of Turkey. Fighter
jets carried out bomb attacks in the course of the extraordinary meeting of the Plenary
Session against the coup attempt. During the attack, Parliament officials, some civilians and
many police officers were injured, and extensive damage was caused to the Parliament
building.
7. On the night of 15 July, tanks ran over civilians and some of them were killed and
injured as a result of being trapped under the tanks. Fighter jets made low altitude flights
over the cities by breaking through the sound barrier and in a manner which would lead to
fear and panic in the public. The TGNA and people were shot randomly by the coup
plotters, snipers directly targeted people from strategic points, the crowd was bombed and
shot from these fighter jets. In brief, the civilians, who defended the democratic regime at
the cost of their lives, were massacred by coup plotters. In the course of the coup attempt,
250 persons were killed and more than 2000 were injured.
8. However, to judge the deeds of this organization with only what transpired on July
15th would be a mistake. To understand why FETÖ/PDY is recognized as a terrorist
organization one needs also to take into consideration the enormity of their previous actions
and the resulting trauma that the Turkish nation has experienced. The so-called educational
services of this organization was in fact the first step of an infiltration campaign where kids
were put through a heavy hand in indoctrination. They were provided with cheat sheets for
entrance exams for prominent schools and later for government jobs. They were turned into
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unquestioning disciples of Fetullah Gülen. They were ordered to stay hidden and to
infiltrate state institutions. To achieve their main goal of capturing the state, the members
of FETÖ eschewed all legal and ethical norms. They bribed, blackmailed, fabricated
documents, tagged and wiretapped people and orchestrated sham trials against anybody
who could stand on their way. Laundering enormous sums of money, arranging illegal
transfers of funds, as well as other financial crimes became business as usual.
9. Accordingly, the references to the said terrorist organization in the Report as
“Gülenist movement” (Paragraph 24, Paragraph 59 and Paragraph 95) should be corrected
as FETÖ/PDY (Fetullahist Terrorist Organization/Parallel State Structure). For perusal and
reference, an Information Note on the said terrorist organization is also attached to this
Addendum.
Terrorist Organization PKK:
10. The Government further would like to underline that PKK is a vicious terrorist
organization, which is included in the lists of terrorist entities of the EU as well as USA and
many other countries in the democratic world. For decades, Turkey has been countering
PKK terrorism which claimed thousands of lives of innocent people and violated the
fundamental rights and freedoms of people; first and foremost, the right to life.
Accordingly, the fact that PKK is a terrorist organization should have been duly alluded
and taken into account in the Report (Paragraph 30).
General Remarks on the Report:
11. As acknowledged in the Report, Turkey’s institutions, constitution and legislation
provide sufficient institutional and legislative safeguards against torture and ill-treatment.
Respect to human dignity constitutes one of the foundations of the Turkish democracy.
12. While emphasizing the serious nature of the security challenges that Turkey faces in
recent years, the Report cites unsubstantiated, generic and vague claims. Many comments
and generic conclusions cited in the Report are built on the claims of a limited number of
persons interviewed and flow of information from unknown sources whose reliability could
well-be questioned and some of them are apparently members of terrorist organizations.
13. The Government wishes to underline that, although the Rapporteur was given access
to all locations where people are deprived of liberty throughout Turkey and was able to
conduct confidential interviews with detainees of his choosing, no physical signs were
reported consistent with allegations of ill-treatment cited in the Report.
14. Certain vague allegations, unsubstantiated claims and anonymous statements cited in
the Report remain unaddressed in this Addendum only due to lack of their clarity and it
should not in any way be commented as that such allegations are accepted.
15. The Government further would like to inform that the Recommendations in the
Report will be duly examined by the relevant Turkish authorities and those
Recommendations based on objective and impartial assessments will be taken into
consideration and implemented where necessary.
16. The Government would also like to recall that Turkey is party to both the UN
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment since 1988 and to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment since 1989. Turkey also has a constructive
cooperation with their respective international monitoring organs namely UN Committee
Against Torture and European Committee For the Prevention of Torture.
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17. Turkey is also party to UN Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture
(OPCAT) and designated Human Rights and Equality Institution as the National Prevention
Mechanism, accordingly since 2012.
18. Therefore, having been party to all relevant international conventions for the
prevention of torture and ill treatment; the Government reiterates its full commitment to the
“policy of zero tolerance against torture” and its determination for the total elimination of
torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.
19. Certain comments regarding the advanced unedited version of the Report are
submitted below under the relevant headlines.
Introduction
20. The Report puts forward that “During his visit, the Rapporteur met with high level
officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice and Interior (including the Turkish
National Police, General Command of Gendarmerie) in Ankara…………………………. He
also met with representatives of United Nations agencies and the diplomatic community,
with civil society organisations, activists, lawyers and doctors, as well as with victims of
torture.”
21. The term in the latter sentence, “victims of torture” should be corrected as “those
who claimed to have been victims of torture”.
Assessment of the situation- General observations
22. Regarding Paragraph 23, the Government wishes to inform that the term “conflict
in the South-East” is incorrect and misleading. The violence erupted in south-east Turkey
after July 2015 can be described as intensified terrorist attacks by PKK. Accordingly, the
Government requests that the unacceptable term “conflict” in Paragraph 23 and in other
paragraphs (5, 29 and 40) should be deleted.
23. Regarding the claims in Paragraph 23, the Government would like to recall that
Turkey, as one of the main pillars of its zero tolerance policy against torture, maintains its
resolute commitment to combat impunity for torture and ill-treatment. To this end, efforts
have been concentrated in (i) further strengthening the national legislation to provide
necessary safeguards to combat impunity and (ii) rendering the law-enforcement complaint
system more efficient and swift while enhancing its transparency and credibility.
(i) Firstly, it is important to indicate that Turkish national legislation includes the
necessary safeguards against impunity for torture and other forms of ill-treatment.
This is also acknowledged in the Report.
24. Even during the State of Emergency, Turkey remains adhered to its commitment to
strengthen its legislation to combat impunity of law-enforcement officials and to prevent
instances of torture and ill-treatment. As a latest sign of this commitment, with the Decree
Law No : 682 on General Disciplinary Provisions as Regards the Law Enforcement
Officers which entered into force on 23 January 2017, a new provision has been put into
effect which provides that law enforcement officers who commit torture shall be imposed
the disciplinary penalty of dismissal from public service.
(ii) With a view to combating impunity through rendering law-enforcement
complaint system more efficient and swift as well as enhancing its transparency and
credibility, the Law No : 6713 on the establishment of Law Enforcement Oversight
Commission was enacted and entered into force on 20 May 2016.
25. The Law is another reform step taken in line with Turkey’s zero tolerance policy
against torture. The Law aims at ensuring swift and efficient investigation and conclusion
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of complaints as to law enforcement officers. It foresees the establishment of a Law
Enforcement Oversight Commission that provides a more effective complaint system and
also envisages the establishment of a central registration system that monitors the
processing of complaints about law enforcement officers as well as the sanctions imposed
as a result of these actions. The central registry system will enter into force following the
adoption of regulatory framework.
26. Within the Directorate General of Prisons and Detention Houses of the Ministry of
Justice (MoJ) there is a complaint Bureau where personal petitions or any complaints
received by BIMER (Communication Centre of the Prime Ministry), CIMER
(Communications Centre of the Presidency), and the Directorate General Prisons and
Detention Houses are investigated in detail and processed as required.
27. Detainees or convicts, their relatives and associations can also file complaints to the
Human Rights Bureau within the Directorate General for Prisons and Detention Houses of
the MoJ. Allegations of violations of human rights are investigated in detail and the
applicants are informed about the developments.
28. In addition; in October 2016, to facilitate the filing and swift processing of torture
and ill treatment complaints, upon the instruction of the Minister of Justice, a specific unit
has been established to deal with all allegations of ill-treatment at the penitentiary
institutions and to inform the relevant persons of the outcomes.
29. In this unit, allegations and comments appeared in the media, reported by the
international organizations and monitoring mechanisms recognised by Turkey are
immediately taken into consideration.
30. Furthermore, a citizen’s portal has been created. The complaints received via this
portal are assessed carefully.
31. As to General Observations (Paragraph 24), the Government wishes to inform that
the allegation regarding “extensive intervention with the human rights……” is unacceptable
as all judicial proceedings against the suspected plotters of the 15th July terrorist coup
attempt and members of FETÖ/PDY are initiated as per decisions of the members of
independent judiciary.
32. In Paragraphs 29 and 30, the PKK and the so-called “Islamic State of Iraq and Al-
Sham (ISIS)” are not indicated as terrorist organizations. Also, the term “Kurdish
insurgency” is a misrepresentation of the reality. Turkish nation is not a juxtaposition of
communities or groups. It is composed of citizens, who are equal before the law
irrespective of their origins in terms of language, race, colour, ethnicity, religion or any
other such particularity, and whose fundamental rights and freedoms are enjoyed and
exercised individually in accordance with the relevant law. While Turkey is countering
PKK terrorism, citizens of Kurdish origin are integral part of the nation. The violent attacks
perpetrated by terrorist organization PKK cannot be described as “Kurdish insurgency”.
Torture and ill treatment
33. The Government wishes to express that allegations of torture and ill treatment raised
in connection with the terrorist coup attempt of 15th July 2016, as well as southeast Turkey,
under this section are unacceptable.
34. It seems that most of the interviewees are apparently members of terrorist
organizations and the Report has given full credit to the statements of suspects of offences
of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of Turkey, establishing an oppressive and
totalitarian system through use of force, violence, threat, blackmailing and other unlawful
means.
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35. Furthermore, it is not clear in the Report that whether such allegations were brought
before justice or any local remedies are exhausted.
Solitary confinement
36. As to unconfirmed claim in Paragraph 32 that “….a great number of persons had
been held in prolonged solitary confinement”, the Government wishes to inform that there
is no practice as “solitary confinement” in Turkish penitentiary system. In certain cases, a
disciplinary measure involving a stay in 1 or 3 persons rooms is applied in line with Law
No : 5275 on the Execution of Sentences and Security Measures. However, those who are
imposed such temporary disciplinary measures are entitled to have the same rights with
other inmates, namely joining recreational activities as well as having fresh air, watching
television, talking over the phone, meeting with visitors or lawyers, reading books and
receiving letters or fax messages.
Strip searches and invasive body searches
37. In connection with the concerns raised in Paragraph 33 and 34 under the title
“Strip searches and invasive body searches”, the Government would like to underline that
searching of all body and belongings of the detainees and convicts transferred to the
Penitentiary Institutions are carried out in accordance with the provisions stipulated in
Article 67 of the “Regulation on the Administration of the Penitentiary Institutions and the
Execution of the Sentences and Security Measures”.
38. In case that there are reasonable and serious indications regarding the fact that
prisoners and detainees carry forbidden items and belongings on them or in their body
cavities and in case that the highest supervisor of the institution deems it necessary,
searching is conducted in accordance with Article 36, titled “Searching” of the Law No :
5275 and the provisions stipulated in Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 46 of the Regulation.
By this way, the detainees and convicts coming to the institution are prevented from
bringing in drugs and hazardous substances in the institution and searching is made with the
strict observance of the principle of respect to human dignity.
39. Necessary regulations including the issues pointed out in the Paragraph 34 already
exist in the legislation in detail and stipulated in the Regulation on the Administration of
the Penitentiary Institutions and the Execution of the Sentences and Security Measures.
40. Furthermore, the personnel in the Penitentiary Institutions are regularly informed on
the current rules and legislation in force. Allegations of ill treatment and abuse are duly
investigated by the Chief Public Prosecutor Offices.
Overcrowding
41. Regarding the concerns raised in connection with “overcrowding in penitentiaries”
(Paragraph 39), the Government would like to inform that the minimum standards for
prison establishments provided in the recommendations of the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe are followed when accommodating detainees and convicts in prison
establishments.
42. Due to the population growth and increase in the number of detainees and convicts
accordingly, new penitentiary institutions are needed in order to solve the capacity problem
of the penitentiary institutions. There might have also been occasional temporary
overcrowding in prison establishments in some cities when an unforeseeable rise occurred
in the number of detentions, as it was seen in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist coup
attempt of the 15 July 2016. However, such problems are addressed in a short period of
time with the construction of new establishments and transfers to other establishments.
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Furthermore, where legally permissible, “judicial control decisions” which is an alternative
measure, are applied.
43. With the Decree Law No: 674 dated 1 September 2016 on the Measures Taken
under the State of Emergency, construction work for new prisons have been accelerated.
With the said Decree Law, it is provided that in case of a need, the construction tender for
new prison establishments can be conducted without the fulfilment of the requirements
foreseen in the investment program. It is planned to construct 228 new prison
establishments until 2021. Among them, 106 are in construction stage, 51 are in the tender
phase, 59 are in the project phase and 12 are in the planning phase. The planned capacity of
these establishments is 333,714.
44. In order to eliminate the problem of overcrowding permanently, the relevant
authorities continuously work on construction and for the improvement of physical
conditions of prison establishments.
45. Furthermore, with a view to increasing the effectiveness of conditional release
regime which will contribute to reducing overcrowding, a project for “Improving
Conditional Release to Strengthen the Regime for Execution of Penal Sentences and
Prevent Re-Commission of Offenses” will start at the end of 2017 for 36 months.
General conditions of detention
46. Regarding the claims cited in Paragraph 41 in connection with “inmates’ visits and
phone calls with family members and lawyers”, the Government would like to inform that
the visits for the convicts and detainees in penitentiary institutions are realized within the
framework of Articles 83, 85 and 86 of The Law No: 5275 on the Execution of Penalties
and Security Measures and the provisions of the Regulation on the Visitation of Convicts
and Detainees.
47. Moreover, free visitations are allowed in accordance with the following provision
included in Subparagraph (e) of Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Regulation on the Visitation
of Convicts and Detainees which stipulates that “Taking into consideration the capacity,
security and order of the institution, convicts and detainees sentenced or detained on the
grounds of the crimes defined in Section 4, 5, 6, 7 of Part 4 of Second Volume of Turkish
Criminal Code No. 5237 and the crimes included in the scope of Anti-terror Law No :
3713, free visitations are allowed within every two months with the decision of
administrative and investigative board”.
48. On the other hand, as per the Decree Law No: 667 dated 23.07.2017, on the
Measures Taken under the State of Emergency, “Remand detainees may be visited merely
by their spouses, up to second degree blood or consanguinity relatives and first degree
relatives by marriage, as well as legal guardians or trustees, provided the relationship is
documented. Powers of the Ministry of Justice and Public Prosecution shall be reserved.
Remand detainees shall exercise their right to communication by phone once every fifteen
days, limited to the persons listed in this sub-paragraph for a maximum of ten minutes.”
49. The interview dates and hours of the of detainees with their attorneys shall be
limited in accordance with Subparagraph (d) of Article 6 of the Decree Law No: 667.
50. The detainees and convicts in the penitentiary institutions benefit from sportive and
cultural activities taking into account security considerations as well as issues such as
physical structure and capacity of the institution and within the framework of the program
prepared by the administration of the institution.
51. The convicts and detainees in penitentiary institutions are encouraged to attend
courses in fields offered such as painting, music, theatre in order to minimize the negative
physical and psychological effects of their situation while serving their sentences.
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52. Moreover, it is allowed for convicts and detainees, held in closed and open
penitentiary institutions, to continue their education through non-formal education
activities. Detainees and convicts in open penitentiary institutions can also have formal
education.
53. Regarding the claims in Paragraph 42 regarding “lack of schooling and insufficient
access to recreational activities for juvenile pre-trial detainees” as well as “adult inmates
not allowed to work”, the Government would like to inform that the juveniles who have
never received formal education or dropped out of education are evaluated by the teachers
working for educational services in penitentiary institutions and all proceedings for the
education of these juveniles are carried out by the said services.
54. Within this framework, while the juveniles held in education houses for minors
benefit from formal and non-formal education, juveniles who are held in juvenile sections
of closed penitentiary institutions and in the institutions for adults benefit from non-formal
education. Moreover, 1st and 2nd Level Literacy Courses are delivered in all penitentiary
institutions. The juveniles who are held in penitentiary institutions for terror-related crimes
also benefit from formal, non-formal education and 1st Level Literacy courses.
55. With a view to securing full rehabilitation of juvenile offenders in penitentiary
institutions, of those who have never attended school or drop-outs are evaluated by the
educational service to continue to their education. As per their needs they are offered
literacy courses or formal education if they are suitable in terms of age and educational
level or to distance learning. Moreover, they may take exams by Student Selection and
Placement Center and the Ministry of National Education within the framework of non-
formal education. Social and cultural activities and studies for juveniles (conferences and
seminars, theatre plays, concerts, movies, painting, comics, folk dances, music, handicrafts,
exhibitions, quiz shows, debates, chess-draught etc. and celebrations of important days and
weeks) are also carried out .
56. In all institutions including at high security penitentiary institutions, within their
capacities, new courses are offered to ensure that inmates would have a profession after
serving their sentences. It is aimed that inmates become equipped with suitable knowledge,
skills and competencies in a dynamic manner in accordance with contemporary needs;
encouraged for entrepreneurship, team work, decision-making and problem-solving and
their adaptation to the changing social and economic conditions is ensured.
57. As per the below-mentioned provisions in Article 29 of The Law on the Execution
of Penalties and Security Measures on “Employment of convicts” and Article 96 of the
Regulation on the Administration of Penitentiary Institutions and on the Execution of
Penalties and Security Measures;
• Convicts who do not have an occupation and who are determined by the institution
doctor to be mentally and physically healthy and convicts who have an occupation
and who are willing to work may be employed in workshops in return for such
wages as shall be fixed according to the means of the institution.
• The purpose of such employment is to ensure that convicts learn an art or trade
which will enable them to maintain themselves after release, and to develop or
strengthen their motivation to work and produce. In the employment of convicts,
their abilities, skills, aptitudes, and mental and physical conditions will be taken into
account.
• The employment of minor convicts shall only be in the field of vocational training.
Minors and juvenile convicts attending education institutions or formal education
may not be employed in workshops during the teaching year.
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• Their employment shall be governed by the provisions of Law No: 3308 of 5 June
1986 on Vocational Training in so far as they do not contradict the provisions of this
Law.
58. In high security closed penitentiary institutions inmates’ requests to work at the
workshops are submitted to the administration and evaluated accordingly.
59. In connection with Paragraph 44 regarding heating conditions in penitentiary
institutions, it is a legal requirement as per Paragraph 4 of Article 63 of the Law on
Execution of Penalties and Security Measures that adequate space, lighting, heating,
ventilation and hygiene shall be provided in rooms and parts in view of climatic conditions
in penitentiary institutions. Accordingly, the heating systems of the penal institutions are
established during the construction. The heating of the penal institutions in winter seasons
is ensured in view of the climatic conditions of the region of the institution.
Separation pre-trial/convict and male/female/juvenile
60. As to Paragraph 47 of the Report recommending a “separation between pre-trial
detainees and convicts in all prison facilities”, the Government would like to submit
following information :
61. The separation recommended in the Report is already a legal requirement according
to Paragraph 3, Article 111 of the Law No: 5275 on Execution of the Penalties and Security
Measures which reads “Separate detention houses may be established for women, minors
and juveniles. In detention houses or in those parts of closed penal execution institutions
which are allocated for detainees, they shall be kept in separate places for adults, women,
juveniles and minors and considering the types of crime.” Implementation is carefully
monitored as per this provision. Therefore, certain individual examples should not be
represented as systematic practices.
Medical care, sanitary conditions and nutrition
62. Regarding the concerns set forth in Paragraph 48 of the Report on “prompt and
adequate access” to medical care, the Government would like to underline that health
requirements in the penal institutions are supervised by physicians. First examination and
treatment services are provided in the institution for the protection of physical and mental
health of the convicts and detainees, and for the diagnosis of the illnesses; those for whom
further examination, treatment and rehabilitation is required are referred to the state
hospitals while those for whom even further examination is required are referred to
university hospitals. All results of the examinations and treatments are recorded in the
personal health folders.
63. As per the relevant law, all sorts of treatment and examination are under the
guarantee of the government and free of charge. The referrals to the hospitals are conducted
in the discretion of the physician according to the medical requirements.
64. Among the inmates, those for whom the specialist physician deemed necessary to
refer to the hospital for in-patient treatment are placed in the convict wards of the hospitals
where their treatment and follow up are carried out.
65. Regarding Paragraph 49 of the Report mentioning “insufficient General
Practitioners in facilities, problems regarding dental care and psychiatric/psychological
support”, the Government would like inform that comprehensive measures have been taken
in Turkey regarding the said health requirements to date.
66. Following the entry into force of Law No: 5283 on the Transfer of the Health Care
Units Belonging to Some of the Institutions and Agencies to the Ministry of Health, first
step healthcare provided to the convicts and detainees by the physicians of the institutions
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affiliated to the Ministry of Justice until 2009, is started to be provided by the Ministry of
Health, within the scope of the universal healthcare system as per the provisions of the
Protocol on the Regulation of the Health Care in the Penitentiary Institutions signed
between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Justice.
67. Currently, healthcare is provided by the family doctors and dentists in line with the
provisions of the Protocol entered into force on 30/04/2009 at all penitentiary institutions.
68. The aforementioned Protocol aims to provide better, effective and efficient
healthcare to all the convicts and detainees placed in the penitentiary institutions. It also
aims to address the issues in the follow-up of the treatments of the convicts and detainees;
to decrease the number of referrals to hospitals and to increase the quality standards in
healthcare provided in the penitentiary institutions.
69. The District Policlinics within the Campuses of Ankara-Sincan, İstanbul-Silivri,
İstanbul-Maltepe and İzmir-Aliağa Penitentiary Institutions provide inpatient treatment
services in the status of a hospital directly attached to the Ministry of Health, and the
treatment and care of the convicts and detainees are carried out in these policlinics upon the
decision of physicians.
70. As per the Article 5 of the aforementioned Protocol, in every institution even those
which are constituent parts of large penitentiary campuses having 1.000 and more detainees
and convicts, the health care services are provided by family doctors. Healthcare is
provided with the support of the physicians for 5 full days in a week in the institutions
having more than 1.000 detainees, convicts and personnel, for 5 half days in the institutions
having 500-1000 detainees, convicts and personnel and for 2 half days in the institutions
having less than 500 detainees, convicts and personnel.
71. Dental services in the penitentiary institutions are provided in the dental units within
the penitentiary institutions by the dentists appointed by the relevant healthcare
organizations.
72. On the other hand, psychologists and social workers serving in the psycho-social
assistance units operating within the penitentiary institutions carry out research and
protective studies for mental and physical health of convicts and detainees and make
necessary interventions during their service. In this context, 4 psychologists and 1 social
worker have been working in D-Type closed prison in Diyarbakir, in order to provide
psychological support to the convicts and detainees.
73. As to the claims in Paragraph 50 in connection with “inmates’ transfer to hospital
and access to the required medical care” the Government would like to submit the
following information.
74. First examination and treatment for the protection of the physical and mental health
of the convicts and detainees as well as the diagnosis of the diseases services are provided
in the institution; diseases which require more examination, treatment and rehabilitation are
referred to public hospitals, the ones which require further medical services are referred to
university hospitals. These decisions are made without any discrimination according to the
doctor’s judgement as per the medical requirements.
75. As mentioned before, all necessary examinations and treatments are free of charge
and under state guarantee. Referral of the convicts and the detainees to the hospital is
provided by the corps of Gendarmerie based on the physician’s decision.
76. However; in case of a sudden illness of the convicts and detainees, 112
77. Emergency Room is informed immediately and patients are referred to the hospital.
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78. As to claims in Paragraph 51 of the Report with regard to “contagious diseases,
HIV/Aids and drug addictions”, the Government would like to convey that in penitentiary
institutions, the convicts and detainees are vaccinated by family physicians. All convicts
and detainees in closed penitentiary institutions are screened for tuberculosis at least once a
year and also every convict and detainee who have been in the penitentiary institution
recently are examined. Those who have been diagnosed with tuberculosis are referred to
the related health institutions.
79. Inmates who have tuberculosis are ensured to inhabit in certain areas (such as
infirmaries) for a period of time which the doctor in charge determines.
80. Also, supervision of the penitentiary institutions in terms of sanitary conditions are
executed periodically by local health authorities and a copy of the report is submitted to the
related chief public prosecutor’s office.
81. In the event that a convict or detainee informs about having a contagious disease in
the first admission, or a diagnosis report regarding the disease is recorded in health file, or
the disease is diagnosed with analyses and examinations after being accepted to the
institution, the cases fall into category of notifiable diseases according to the Article 57 of
Law No: 1593 Public Health Law (such as AIDS, acute bloody diarrhea, whooping cough,
brucella, diphtheria, gonorrhoea, mumps, measles, rubella, cholera, rabies, tetanus, polio,
malaria, syphilis, anthrax, typhoid fever, tuberculosis, H1N1 and acute viral hepatitis) the
Department of District Health Group and Local Health Authorities are notified by the
physician/dentist, health officer, other health personnel or institution manager in charge of
the penitentiary institution. The required treatment starts immediately and all measures with
a view to preventing the spread of the disease are taken urgently.
82. In this context, if an inmate is diagnosed with a contagious disease as she or he is
examined in the infirmary of the penitentiary institution, he or she is immediately referred
to a healthcare organization where a specialist physician is present for further examination
and treatment. Their treatment and controls are made regularly, every phase of the disease
is carefully followed in accordance with the medical requirements and legislation.
Counter-terrorism law and decree
83. As to claims in Paragraph 69, the Government would like to clarify that the Law
6722 does not grant any immunity for any law enforcement official. It only requires the
permissions of the competent administrative authorities before criminal investigations for
the law enforcement forces and other civilians taking part in counter-terrorism operations
for the suspected offences that might have been committed while carrying out their duties.
84. The exclusion is not a blanket of liability. The prosecutors are able to investigate the
suspected offences after getting the permission. If the permission is not granted, the
prosecutors or other relevant parties (victims, lawyers etc) have a right to appeal to the
administrative court against the decision.
Lack of review of emergency decrees and related human rights violations
85. In Paragraph 83. it is claimed that “......Since the Special Rapporteur's visit, the
Constitutional Court reviewed a number of cases and concluded that it was not competent
to receive the complaints because legal remedies had not been exhausted."
86. The Government would like to bring to the attention that the Constitutional Court
reviewed a number of cases on State of Emergency measures and administrative acts and
found those complaints inadmissible because legal remedies had not been exhausted. As far
as the individual applications are concerned the Constitutional Court has not concluded that
it was not competent to receive any complaints.
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12
87. Furthermore, pursuant to the Decree Law No: 685, the Inquiry Commission on the
State of Emergency Measures (“the Commission”) was established in order to carry out an
assessment of, and render a decision on, applications related to certain measures directly
conducted by virtue of the Decree Laws on account of having membership, affiliation or
connection with terrorist organizations. The Commission has the authority to conduct an
examination as to the measures concerning the dismissal or discharge from public service,
profession or organization in which the persons held office, the dismissal from studentship,
the closure of institutions and organizations and the revocation of the ranks of retired
personnel. The Commission received applications from 17th July through 14th September
2017. In the event that a new Decree is issued, it will continue to receive applications in
connection with that Decree. Moreover, parties having legal interest are entitled to file
actions against the decisions of the Commission with the Ankara administrative courts
which will be determined by the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors.
88. The fact that a judicial remedy has been introduced against the decisions of the
Commission is to provide the persons dismissed or discharged from public service,
profession or organization in which they held office or closed institutions and organizations
with the opportunity to bring their cases before the independent judiciary. The Commission
decisions can be appealed. Besides, individual application to the Constitutional Court is
applicable.
89. On 12 June 2017, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the Inquiry
Commission has to be resorted to in order to exhaust domestic remedies. This clearly
recognizes the Inquiry Commission as a legal remedy for the measures taken directly as a
part of the legislative decrees.
90. Furthermore, through the Review Boards established within public institutions and
the Prime Ministry, around 35 thousand public employees have been reinstated to date.
Around 350 private entities have also been reopened.
91. As to Paragraph 85, in connection with a decision on “no grounds to investigate
and prosecute a torture complaint in Trabzon”, the Government would like to inform that
the said decision was not taken to due to the so-called “immunity given to State officials
under the State of Emergency decrees”, but due to insufficient evidence proving the claims
of ill treatment. Furthermore, decision of “no grounds to investigate and prosecute” was
later repealed and judicial proceedings are currently underway regarding claims.
92. In connection with Paragraph 88, the Government wishes to advise that the civil
inspectors who can inspect holding cells are from the Ministry of Interior and in addition to
governors, mayors and Human Rights Inquiry Commission of the Parliament, the members
of the Parliament can also monitor these places.
93. With respect to the statement in Paragraph 88, the Government wishes to inform
that, relevant Ombudsman and experts of Ombudsman Institution pay visits to prisons and
removal centers. Ombudsman Institution issued a Recommendation, dated 02.12.2016 and
numbered 2015/6136, as a result of investigations and on site visit to Aşkale Removal
Centre on 20-21 January 2016.
Lack of monitoring of detention locations
94. Regarding the Turkish National Human Rights and Equality Institution, the
Government is of the opinion that Paragraph 90 should be amended as “…..However, at
the time of the visit, due to the delays caused by attempted coup on 15 July 2016, no
commissioners for the board had been appointed to the Institution.
95. As far as “the dismantling of the Prison Monitoring Boards” are concerned
(Paragraph 91), the Government would like to inform that with the Decree Law No: 673,
A/HRC/37/50/Add.2
13
dated 02.09.2016 on “Measures to be Taken Under the State of Emergency”, memberships
of then the President of Monitoring Boards and other members have been terminated. Yet,
new member elections have been completed shortly afterwards. To date, 143 Monitoring
Boards have been reinstated in 135 Assize centres; 714 presidents and members have been
selected by related judiciary justice commission in these institutions. 394 of the members
serving in the Monitoring Boards are newly elected and 320 are old members.
96. In 2016, 382 penitentiary institutions were visited 1.385 times by the 143
Monitoring Boards and as a result of these visits, 852 reports have been drawn up. 1.312
recommendations were made in these reports. Recommendations of the monitoring boards
have a breakdown of 8 main categories, namely, execution implementations, rehabilitation
studies, health, living conditions, internal security services, referral and transfer processes,
physical structure and personnel. In addition to this, there are also recommendations
regarding the financial issues. The number of recommendations fulfilled is 962. Thus,
fulfilment rate is 73 %.
97. As required by the Article 6 of Law No: 4681 Penitentiary Institutions and Monitory
Boards of Detention Houses, Monitoring Board Activity Report of the previous year is
publicly announced every year. “2016 Activity Report of Monitoring Boards” has been
drawn up and submitted in 2017.
98. Furthermore, between 01.01.2017 - 15.11.2017, 383 penitentiary institutions were
visited 1.347 times by the 143 monitoring boards and as a result of these visits, 850 reports
have been drawn up.
Documentation of torture and forensic medical examinations
99. As to claims in Paragraph 93 of the Report, the Government wishes to inform that
psychological evaluation of inmates are conducted by the psychologists and social workers
who work in the psycho-social help services in the penitentiary institutions.
100. In addition, within the scope of “Structured Psychological Evaluation and
Intervention Program” implemented in penitentiary institutions, an early diagnosis and
evaluation system has been set up for the purpose of recognition of psychological problems
of inmates in early stages. The system consisting of 3 stages is finalized when Research and
Evaluation Form (Araştırma ve Değerlendirme Formu-ARDEF) has been filled by the
relevant official so that an individualized program for treatment inmate is developed.
101. Regarding Paragraph 95, the Government underlines that all forensic autopsies are
performed by experts of Council of Forensic Medicine and in case of deaths in custody or
in prison, and all autopsies are performed in accordance with the Minnesota Protocol.
102. As to the unfounded allegations in Paragraph 96, the Government would like to
stress that those who claim to have been victims of torture or ill treatment are examined
independently by Forensic Medicine Specialists, in accordance with Istanbul Protocol and
they perform their duties free from any sort of pressure.
Recommendations:
103. The Government would like to share its observations with regard to some of the
Recommendations in the Report in following articles.
104. In connection with Conclusion A-4-g the delays on the work of the National Human
Rights and Equality Institution caused mainly by the re-organization process and terrorist
coup attempt of 15th July. At present, the institution is determined to carry out its duties
within the framework of national preventive mechanism function, in cooperation with SPT,
CPT and other international mechanisms, relevant public institutions, particularly the
Human Rights Inquiry Commission of the Parliament, the Monitoring Boards for Prisons
A/HRC/37/50/Add.2
14
and Detention Centres and the Ombudsman Institution, as well as with all relevant non-
governmental organizations in order to ensure that the Institution is able to effectively fight
against torture and ill-treatment.
105. Currently, the reports of the Monitoring Boards for Prisons and the Provincial and
Sub-provincial Human Rights Boards and the applications received by the Institution are
under consideration. The Institution is in the process of planning visits with a view to fulfill
its function as NPM.
106. In this context, it has performed its first visits as the National Prevention Mechanism
to the police headquarters, psychiatric nursing hospitals and prisons in Rize and Trabzon,
on October 16-18, 2017.
107. With regard to Recommendation 4-(b) (“ensure adequate access to work, training,
education and recreation for all offenders, including terrorism-related convicts…”) the
Government would like to refer that the Law No: 5275 on the Execution of Sentences and
Security Measures takes the rehabilitation during execution as a basis. It is stipulated in
Article 7 of the said Law that:
(1) The success of programs aiming at the rehabilitation of convicts during the
execution of prison sentences shall be measured by new attitudes and skills gained
by convicts. For this purpose, there should be motivation on the side of convict
towards the efforts of rehabilitation.
(2) The prison sentence shall be executed in accordance with such programs,
methods, means and mentality as shall be designed to minimise the harmful effects
inherent in the prison sentence. The means of rehabilitation shall be implemented
according to procedures and principles that shall ensure the protection of the
convict’s health and his self-respect.”
108. In addition, “Part Four”, which includes 8 different Sections and 29 different
Articles of the Law No: 5275, has been dedicated only to the matter of “Rehabilitation” and
it has been guaranteed in the legislation that utmost sensitivity to this matter shall be
displayed.
109. As to Recommendation 4-(d) (“ensure the prioritisation of alternatives to detention
for all juvenile offenders…..ensure their detention in separate rehabilitation facilities…”)
the Government would like to inform that alternatives to detention for juvenile offenders
are in place and progressing.
110. In this regard, “Anka Child Support Programme” is developed by the Ministry of
Family and Social Policies (MFSP). In this program, field personnel and academics work
on preparing pyscho-social support and intervention schemes for children under protection,
i.e. staying at child support centers of MFSP, who are drifted into crime, victims of crime,
at risk of crime and living on streets.
111. Concerned child’s needs and risks are assessed by way of individualized need and
risk evaluation form (INRDF) (BİRDEF).
112. It is aimed that children drifted into crime, victims of crime, at risk of social dangers
on streets are motivated to be open minded, forward-looking, self-improving, believing in
success and themselves, to live in welfare and to be prosperous individuals.
113. Within the framework of Anka Child Support Program, a professional consultant is
assigned to every child by institution director. The consultant fills an individualized risk
and need evaluation form for accepted child in the first ten days. On the form, how the child
came to the institution, reason of acceptance, educational status of child, economic status
of the family, habitual residence, friendship relationships, physical status, psychological
status, addiction status, abuse and delinquency status, personal characteristics, behavioural
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15
problems and family characteristics are evaluated. With regard to risks and needs, after the
form evaluation, group work and individual consultancy service is served to the child and
his/her family.
114. In individual consultancy services, home escaping, self-harm behaviours, suicide,
victimisation of abuse, crisis management, intervention to crisis and trauma modules are
implemented.
115. Group works consist of modules on personal development, healthy life, emotional
arrangement, personality improvement and addiction. While personality improvement and
healthy life modules are applied to all children, other modules also varies according to
individual circumstances such as being drifted into crime, victims of crime, substance
addiction, pregnancy, anger management, impulse disorder etc.
116. With regard to Recommendation 5-(g) (“ensure adequate training of all health
professionals involved with detainees, ….application of the Istanbul and Minnesota
Protocols;”); the Government would like to recall that at the training centres for the
personnel of the penal institutions and prisons, information on the importance and scope of
the Istanbul Protocol and its implementation principles relevant to the complaints of torture
is taught to the personnel responsible for conducting the healthcare services of penitentiary
institutions.
117. Also, during the training programs for the administrative and technical personnel of
the penitentiary institutions, which are carried out with the support of the Directorate of the
Institution of Forensic Medicine, the scope and principles of Istanbul Protocol is
elaborated.
118. Moreover, until today, 33,223 personnel have received trainings on “Human Rights”
at the training centres for the personnel of the penitentiary institutions.
119. Regarding the Recommendation 5-(i), (“ensure and facilitate regular, effective and
independent monitoring of all institutions or locations where individuals may be deprived
of their liberty, by national and local bodies…;”) the Government wishes to submit
following information:
120. In addition to its own supervisory bodies mentioned above (Article 40), the
penitentiary institutions directed by the Directorate-General of Prisons and Detention
Houses of the Ministry of Justice are monitored by ;
• -The Human Rights Inquiry Commission of Parliament, constituting the members or
parliament selected by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey according to the
Law No: 3686 of the Commission on Human Rights Inquiry,
• -The Monitoring Boards established by the Law No: 4681,
• -The Ombudsman Institution established by the Law No: 6328,
• -The Human Rights and Equality Institution of Turkey, established by the Law No:
6701 dated 20 April 2016.
121. Furthermore;
• -Since Turkey is a party of the European Convention against Torture and other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment since 1989 and is a party to
Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) since 2011, all institutions or
locations where individuals may be deprived of their liberty are also open to
international monitoring.
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16
• Apart from the investigations conducted by the bodies that are independent from the
administration, judicial review is also ensured as a result of the exercise of the right
to objection against the Offices of Judge of Execution established by the Law No:
4675 and of the right to individual application to the Constitutional Court and to the
European Court of Human Rights.
122. Regarding the Recommendations-7(a), (b), (c) and (d) (“ensure that all detainees
remain under the direct supervision of guards and law enforcement officers of the same
gender at all times including transfers”…. body searches, strip searches and any other
physical examinations medical examinations and consultations”) the Government would
like to recall that transfer and referral of the convicts and detainees are essentially carried
out by the external safety officer, in line with the provisions of the Protocol on the Conduct
of the Management, External Protection, Transfer and Referral of Convicts and Detainees
and Medical Services of the Penal Institutions.
123. In Article 19 of the said Protocol following provisions are set out:
• Except for obligatory cases, the letter for referring the convicts and detainees to
hospital or hearing shall be sent to the gendarmerie two days prior at the latest, and
the convicts and detainees shall be duly transferred on the day or at the hour
required by the gendarmerie protection unit command.
• Except for obligatory cases, transfer of the convicts and detainees to be transferred
to another penal institutions shall be made within a month at the latest, from the time
when the relevant letters are referred to the gendarmerie.
• Except for obligatory cases, the information on referral of the convicts and detainees
to be transferred shall be reported to the institution’s administration, at the latest one
day before the transfer.
• For the referral of female convicts and detainees to a hospital or hearing within the
province, female execution and protection officers shall be assigned in case there is
no enough female gendarmerie officers.”
124. Within this scope, female convicts and detainees are transferred, accompanied by
female gendarmerie or the female personnel of Directorate General of Prisons and
Detention Houses of the MoJ.
125. On the other hand, searches are made in accordance with the third paragraph of the
Article 46 of the Regulation on the Administration of Penal Institutions and the Execution
of Penalties and Security Measures, stipulating that “Body search shall be made by the
security and custody officers of the same gender”.
126. During the medical examination of convicts and detainees, actions are taken in strict
observance of the privacy of the patients, in line with the following provisions of Article 38
(“Ensuring safety and patient privacy during medical examinations”) of the Protocol on
the Conduct of the Management, External Protection, Transfer and Referral of Convicts and
Detainees and Medical Services of the Penal Institutions:
• In the hospitals located in an area where a Directorate for Penal Institution is
present, secured clinics, where breakout is prevented, shall be established.
• Examination of the convicts and detainees shall be made in such secured clinics
preventing breakout. The gendarmerie shall be on guard outside the clinic and take
necessary security measures. Upon the physician’s written request, the gendarmerie
shall be present inside the clinic.
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17
• However, all kinds of illegitimate requests of the convicts and detainees during the
medical examination shall immediately be reported by the medical personnel to the
gendarmerie patrol commander.
• Until the secured clinics for the convicts and detainees are established in hospitals,
the gendarmerie shall be present in the current clinic, taking protective measures
where he/she cannot hear the conversation between the physician and the doctor.
Annex
A/HRC/37/50/Add.2
19
FETULLAH GÜLEN AND FETÖ
1. BRIEF HISTORY OF FETÖ
The foundations of FETÖ were laid by Fetullah Gülen in Izmir in 1966.
In the early 1970s Fetullah Gülen and an inner circle of friends established the core
cadre for the organization.
The organization fed on perceptions of exclusion among Turkish society’s
conservative, pious section. The perception was that the traditionally secular state
had excluded religious people from politics and state institutions. The regime had to
be more Islamic, but in the way Fetullah Gülen understood it.
Solution for success advocated by Gülen was to be patient, to portray the movement
as a benevolent civil society organization and gradually infiltrate key state
institutions.1 In other words, Gülen aspired capturing the State from within rather
than attacking it from outside. To this end, the organization has moved with secrecy
rather than transparency and built a wall of invisibility around itself to give the
impression that it was non-existent. 2
They exploited religious themes and concentrated their activities particularly on
students and other youth groups aged 13-18 years. Fetullah Gülen communicated his
views through sermons and speeches recorded and distributed on audiocassettes and
videotapes. Communal gatherings and particularly summer camps were other
methods used to disseminate Gülen’s views on religion to a larger group of
followers.
By the end of 1970’s, Gülen had already become a leader of a distinct, cultish
religious group.
In the process the movement became double-faced. The visible face was non-
confrontational, charity-oriented, education movement. The darker face was a
secretive, highly hierarchical, anti-democratic, self-styled religious formation around
the persona of Fetullah Gülen, a cult of personality.
In short, the organization gradually turned from a religious movement into a
secretive operational structure aimed to transform society by taking control of the
Turkish state from within. As its strength grew, the organization began to claim a
messianic mission at a global level, depicting Fetullah Gülen as the “Imam of the
Universe”; “the Chosen One”.
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5gptKWc089A: “You must move in the arteries of the
system without anyone noticing your existence until you reach all the power centers… until
the conditions are ripe … You must wait until such time as you have gotten all the state
power, until you have brought to your side all the power of the constitutional institutions in
Turkey… Until that time, any step taken would be too early - like breaking an egg without
waiting the full 40 days for it to hatch. It would be like killing the chick inside.” 2 “Presence of our friends in vital bodies like Court Houses, Civil Services or in another
important body should not be considered as individual acts. These people are our guarantee
for the future in these bodies. They are the guarantee of our presence.”.
“As of 1967, the number of those educated (by him) has been 13460. The educated people
have already been placed in some institutions. The services should be secret and swift. In
order to realize an Islamic revolution in Turkey, two conditions should be met: the first one is
to gain the support of the 40% of public; and second one is to obtain political and economic
support from the communities within the foreign States (both Muslim and non-Muslim).
When Turkey comes to the point where these two conditions are met, our members in top
positions within the state will take action (15 April 1987, Istanbul, during the 2-month
training camp of 36”regional imams”).
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20
The evolution from a religious cult into a criminal organization can be broadly
examined in three phases:
The first phase lasted until the military coup of September 12, 1980. During this
phase, special dormitory houses (Işık Evleri- “Heavenly light houses”) and
preparatory schools were established to recruit followers. In this phase, the
organization concentrated also on infiltrating state institutions, in particular the
critical ones such as the police.
In the second phase (1980-late 1990s), the organization doubled down on
educational activities. Infiltration to public institutions in high numbers began. In
order to raise revenues, the organization turned itself into a quasi-corporation and
formed a conglomerate (Kaynak Holding), established a bank (Bank Asya) and
commenced activities in areas other than education such as health (Şifa Hospitals),
transportation (Sürat Logistics), and media (Zaman newspaper, Samanyolu TV,
etc). Moreover, this phase was the start of the globalization of the organization.
Following the end of the Cold War, Fetullah Gülen expanded his network in
Caucasia, the Central Asia and the Balkans, and eventually established presence in
around 160 countries across the world.
The third phase, began after the so-called post-modern coup of February 28,
1997, and ended with the infamous coup attempt of FETÖ on 15 July 2016.
Faced with a judicial process incriminating him on attempting to overthrow the
secular constitutional regime, Fetullah Gülen left the country in 1999, and settled in
the USA3. This marked as one of the milestones in the internationalization of the
organization. After departing Turkey for the United States, Gülen adopted a new
rhetoric, presenting himself and his organization as an enlightened, pro-Western
progressive and moderate manifestation of Islam; concentrated on such themes as
“interfaith dialogue”.
In the same period, the process of democratization and efforts for inclusive
governance accelerated in Turkey, with the coming to power of AK Party. The
governing party opened channels for conservative/religious groups to find a stronger
voice in politics.
Yet, Gülenists purposefully chose not to enter into politics and compete legitimately
within democratic rules. Instead, they continued attempts to capture more positions
in the civil service by people with a hidden allegiance to Gülen, not to the legitimate
public authority.
Efforts of the organization taking control of the state apparatus became stronger
since mid-2000s. Members of the organizations who had already taken key positions
in the judiciary and the police resorted to illegal methods to purge the opponents of
the organization, including those in the army. Forged documents, faked evidences,
sham trials, illegal wiretapping, blackmailing etc. were used for this purpose.4 In
short, the organization that started as a religious movement became a Parallel State
Structure posing a grave threat to the democratic, secular, constitutional regime of
Turkey.
The Government’s efforts to eradicate this threat intensified in the last three years
and the controlling power of FETÖ in most of the state institutions was eliminated.
15 July coup attempt was the last and bloodiest resort of the organization to survive
in Turkey.
3 It is noteworthy that the estate he now resides (Golden Generation Worship and Retreat
Center) had been purchased and transformed to become his eventual sanctuary as early as
1991.
4 For reference, find the attached note on the Sledgehammer Trials.
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21
2. IDEOLOGY OF THE ORGANIZATION AND THE
LEADERSHIP
FETÖ, like other terrorist organizations, has its own on peculiar
faith/ideological base and a narrative that enable its members endure difficulties,
sacrifice personal relations, and do anything to reach their goals. FETÖ members
carry out all kind of deeds with no regard to any legal and moral codes, by acting in
full obedience with the leader and believing in their righteousness.
The absolute leader and the only dominant person of the organization is
Fetullah GÜLEN. Other executives carry out the work assigned by him and on
behalf of him.
GÜLEN is called by members of the organization as the “Imam of the
Universe”, “Divine Human”, “Great Master”, “One who has the talent of
communication with metaphysic world and afterlife”, “Mahdi”, “Messiah”, “Divine
Person”, Honorable”, and “Master Teacher”.
Attributing divinity to himself GÜLEN considers that he is not bound by any
religious, moral, or judicial rules. He regards himself as an authority that can behave
opposite to what he says, overturn a religious prohibition, put into practice new
bans. He sees himself as an authority capable of changing basic religious codes.
From the onset of his movement Gülen made his followers believe that in
order to survive under a suppressive secular State, they should act with absolute
precation. In Gülenist terminology “Precaution” refers to an array of things to
obscure a member’s affiliation with the organization: hiding the books of the
Organization; going in and out of the Organization’s secret houses not in groups but
one by one; being very careful when meeting somewhere in case of being followed;
and most importantly obeying the instructions of the leaer.
While asking the members of the Organization to be cautious, he was also
taking them under his wings and putting his clamps on them. In other words, he
became more powerful by scaring the members and strengthening their feeling of
belonging with the Organization.
Members of the Organization learns and practices “the precaution” from the
very first moment when they became a part of the Organization. Over the course of
time, precaution evolves and turns into the practice of “hypocrisy”.
Under the absolute dominance of its leader, the ideology of FETÖ is also
formed by opinions and ideas of GÜLEN. In the eyes of Gülen, humanity is simply
divided between the “men of the service” and “others”. He further categorizes
‘others’ into two groups: ‘those who can be attracted to the organization’ and ‘the
enemy front’. Such a distinction provides a reason for legitimacy to the
Organization, since it always seeks an enemy front, defines itself over this enemy
and motivates its members over this enemy.
The strategic aims of the organization are three-fold:
Political: to seize all constitutional institutions of Republic of Turkey
(executive, legislative and judicial powers) to create a new system based on the
dominance of an elite (Gülenist) class and to become an influential political power at
international level,
Economical: to form a parallel taxation system under the name of
“Benevolent contributions” by exploiting religious feelings of the society, to
establish big holdings and companies including education institutions, finance,
media, NGOs and health institutions at home and abroad and to administer economic
power by means of its own cadres who were raised with the culture of absolute
obedience,
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22
Social and Cultural: to create a new model of human being called “men of
the Service” characteristics of which are given in the discourses of GÜLEN; to form
a new society comprised of this new human model, a monotype personality; to
define social and cultural relationships in terms of new human-society, and therefore
to administer social power.
Hence, FETÖ’s general ideology is “ to seize all constitutional institutions of
“Republic of Turkey (executive, legislative and judicial powers) and to administer
economic, social and political power by an elite class having oligarchic (aristocratic)
features by redesigning State, society and individuals within the direction of
ideology of FETÖ after this process is completed”.
3. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ORGANIZATION
FETÖ has a two-tiered organizational model and a strict hierarchy.
The first layer is the legal and visible side. On appearance, GÜLEN leads a
civil movement called “Hizmet “(Service). They run a variety of associations in
media, education, humanitarian work, printing and banking sector, business
associations etc. Under the guise of legitimate social service efforts, the organization
gained access to vast financial resources, human capital, political and social
influence.
Yet, the organization has also a dark underbelly, operating in secrecy in a
very strict hierarchical manner. This layer is run by a caste system created by
GÜLEN.
GÜLEN has an obsession with “seven levels of heaven” and divided his members
into seven categories. It is a strict, hierarchical caste system where promotion to
upper levels is possible, yet advancing above the fourth level is conditional upon the
verdict by the Leader.
First Level; Commons: This level consists of those who provide practical and
financial support, assuming that they are helping a religious charity movement. Most
of them are not included in the Organization’s hierarchic structure. They are
common people who serve the Organization but generally unaware of its illegal
activities. Those in this level are lured to the Organization because they believe in
the good deeds of Islamic charity.
Second Level; Loyals: This is a loyal group working at the schools, private
teaching institutions, dormitories, banks, newspapers and foundations of FETÖ, or
those members working at state institutions. The members in this level regularly
participate in the meetings, pay subscription fees, and know a little bit about the
ideology of the Organization. In order to be included in this level, one should be a
member of the Organization.
Third Level; Ideological Organization Level: The members in this level are
involved in unofficial activities. They are the ones who have adopted the
Organization’s ideology and are devoted to the Organization on the highest degree.
They spread the ideas of the Organization in their circle.
Fourth Level; Inspection and Controlling Level: The members in this level
supervise the whole service (legal and illegal). Those who rank the highest in respect
of devotion and loyalty can advance to this category. They are selected and included
in the Organization from childhood. Those who join the Organization later on
generally cannot be assigned to positions at this level.
Fifth Level; Organizing and Executing Level: This level requires top secrecy.
The members in this level hardly ever know each other. They are the ones assigned
by GÜLEN to organize and execute the structure within the state.
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23
Sixth Level; Privileged Level: The members in this level enable the
communication between GÜLEN and lower categories. They are assigned by
GÜLEN and deal with appointments within the Organization and expulsion from the
Organization.
Seventh Level; Leadership Level: This level is composed of 16 top
executives plus GÜLEN who are unconditionally devoted to and assigned by
GÜLEN.
Cell Type Chain Structuring;
One important reason why FETÖ could not be deciphered easily is that the
Organization preferred the cell type horizontal structuring model. The cells are units
mostly composed of maximum 5 people and affiliated with a senior brother/sister.
The cells form a chain where they are firstly affiliated with senior Imams, then
country, continent and executive directors.
Senior Bodies that Manage the Organization
The Supreme Boards under Fetullah GÜLEN manage the units of the
Organization and regulate its activities. These Board are Advisory Board, Mullahs,
Appointment Board and Special Service Units.
a) Advisory Board (Grand Nobles Board):
This is an executive board consisting of the members whom the Leader of the
Organization consults with. They are 16 people who serve as both advisors and
leading directors of the units of the Organization. Members of this board are those
who have been with GÜLEN from the foundation of the Organization, and
GÜLEN’s own relatives. They collect information, report to Gülen about the
collected information guide other members, carry out control and investigation tasks
A considerable number of Grand Nobles live in the United Statas together with
GÜLEN.
b) Mullahs:
Origionally religious scholars by profession, Mullahs act as inspectors of
GÜLEN. GÜLEN trained them personally. Mullahs have dominance upon the
Leadership Level
Privileged Level
Organizers and Executives
Inspectors and Controllers
Ideological Structuring Level
Loyals
Commons
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Organization. They are highly respected within the Organization. In case a problem
occurs, GÜLEN appoints these Mullahs whom he totally trusts.
c) Special Service Unit:
GÜLEN, also meets one-to-one with the members called “special service
unit” and appoint them to do his private works/affairs
General structuring of the Organization is ranked in the following chart and
below:
Imam of the Universe,
Continent Imams,
Country Imams,
County Imams,
Province Imams,
Town Imams,
District Imams,
Neighborhood Imams
House Imams (senior brothers/sisters) (In each special houses of FETÖ 4-5
students are invited to stay. The related Senior Brother is responsible for the students
in that house. It is the first step of recruiting new members to the Organization. The
Organization gives scores to students based on their loyalty and dependence to the
Organization. According to the scoring system, those who get 5-4 or 5-5 can become
House Imams. There is also always a senior sister responsible for female students in
a house. )
Hierarchic Parallel State Structuring:
Apart from geographical structuring, as referred to above, there are also
Imams in each state institution responsible for the FETÖ members working there.
This unit, which acts secretly even within the Organization, is not only present in
Turkey, but also abroad, and tries to gain control of state institutions in countries
where the Organization is present.
There is also a “phantom structure” in the Organization. Only GÜLEN
knows and appoints its members. The duty of the phantom structure is to monitor
the high level members in order to prevent regional, provincial, town and district
Imams from betraying the organization.
Secret Service Imams: These units are deemed by the Organization and
Fetullah GÜLEN as the most important. It is the backbone of the Organization and
consists of the Imams of Judiciary, Police, Armed Forces, National Intelligence
Agency Ministry of Education and other critical state institutes such as OSYM
(centralized testing and placement center), TUBİTAK (Scientific Research Center),
GATA(Military Medical Academy)
Through this unit, FETÖ was able to extent its influence to the extent that
they were able to appoint all the members of the Court of Cassation and the High
Council of Judges and Prosecutors in 2010 elections. There are several examples of
court decisions taken by the FETÖ linked judges advancing the interests of FETÖ
by means of their members in the judiciary. By using the secret service units in the
judiciary and police units simultaneously and in coordination, the Organization was
also able to orchestrate large scale sham trials against hundreds of politicians,
bureaucrats, civil servants, journalist and military officers who stood on their way.
Similarly, a civilian “imam” is responsible for the FETÖ structuring within
the Police. Below this imam comes other low ranking “imams” responsible for each
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25
police unit such as counter-terrorism department or intelligence department. FETÖ-
affiliated police officers take orders from these civilian imams, rather than their legal
superiors. This was the reason why these FETÖ-linked police conducted large scale
illegal wiretapping all over Turkey; they acted upon the orders of their FETÖ imams
and paid no respect to their institutional superiors or legal codes.
FETÖ members in the Turkish Armed Forces are also subordinate to a
civilian Imam. As the military is the most important institution for the purposes of
FETÖ, the Imam assigned for this post is also very important. The Organization
started infiltrating to the military after 1980s. They selected poor but clever students,
brainwashed them at the “Houses” and directed them to Military Schools.
The organization also formed special unit imams in
ÖSYM (Student Selection and Placement Center) to ensure mass staffing at
the public institutions,
• TİB (Telecommunications Communication Presidency) to carry out illegal
interception and intelligence gathering, and
• TÜBİTAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey) to
control scientific and technological researches.
Overseas Structuring:
For every continent, the Organization has Imams responsible for the activities
of the organization. Below them are Country Imams. In each country where FETÖ is
active, FETÖ activities are financially supported by members from a specific
Province in Turkey. For example, the cost of FETÖ activities in country A are
generally borne by FETÖ members in the Turkish city of B. In return, the latter are
provided with business opportunities and networks in that country.
A /H
R C
/3 7
/5 0
/A d
d .2
2 6
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4. WORKING MODALITIES
The working modalities of the organization are based on secrecy, opaqueness and
“precaution”:
Taking an oath that promises strict obedience and loyalty to the leader
special encrypted communications, such as ByLock, Tango, Eagle
using “one-dollar bill”s with special serial numbers in accordance with their rank, in order to show their allegiance with the organization
Using code names in order not to reveal their identity
Disseminating coded messages hidden in Gülen’s sermons and interviews
Hiding affiliation with the Organization at any cost, posing as “secular”, “atheist”, “leftist”, “liberal” according to prevailing circumstances.
Imposition of counter-intelligence measures
Organization has made the notion of secrecy and concealment a life style which obliged
the members to adopt hypocritical attitudes and behaviors. The statements of Fetullah
Gülen as detailed below reflect his hypocritical mind.
“.. Consider the philosophy of Islam: The one who commits adultery at the war front is
not punished with penalties in Islamic Law. The hand of the one who steal anything at the
war front is not cut. A person who slanders at the war front is not penalized for slander.
They are not allowed to do these kinds of things again but punishments do not take place at
the war front. Why? Life is sweet. What if he changes his side? Heaven forbid, what if he
abandons his religion? What if he sides with the enemy? This is the philosophy of Islam”.
All these measures, including using code names, peculiar communication language,
counter-intelligence, and encrypted communication methods has made FETÖ almost
invisible. Fetullah Gülen seized the advantages of this invisibility both in defense of the
organization and in attacking the “enemy”.
“In Fiqh books, it is said that ‘If anyone is forced to adultery, then they are not
considered as having committed it. Anyone who is in trouble may deny Allah,
verbally’….Strengthening the hand of enemies in a manner that it will be disadvantageous
for such a case is like a sin that cannot be overcome.”
“A well-balanced man of the Service does not immediately say the things he will say.
He knows that if he says everything right now, there may be some people who will not let
him live. The conditions may become heavier against him, therefore he might fall in a
problematic ambient.”
5. RECRUITMENT/INDOCTRINATION
Schools are the main recruitment grounds for FETÖ.
In Turkey the target group are poor families. Abroad, mainly in Central Asia and
Africa, influential families are targeted for these schools established by this organization. It
is estimated that around 1000 educational institutes are owned and managed by FETÖ
worldwide.
In addition, the so-called “Heavenly Light Houses” with 5-6 students each, are
used to recruit and indoctrinate the new generation. Anyone who was not trained in one of
these houses is not accepted as a main member and is not assigned for organizational tasks.
Currently the top administrative staff of the Organization are all composed of those former
students who were trained in the first heavenly light houses built by GÜLEN decades ago.
The Gülenist military officers who actively participated in the coup attempt by on 15
July, and the other members of the Organization who provided support to them were all
trained in these houses.
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Students trained in these houses are brainwashed to give priority to “the Service”
instead of “homeland”, “capturing the political power” instead of “democracy”, They are
thought on “the Grand Nobles ruled by GÜLEN; an oligarchic administration where
sovereignty is exercised by aristocratic class” instead of the “sovereignty of people”.
The expert personnel called “mentors”, who are assigned to provide human
resources for the Organization act in line with a pre-detailed method especially in bigger
cities.
After the first contact is established with the targeted student, “TREAT” is put in
process meaning: family visits, picnics, meals in beautiful and distinguished places, social
and cultural activities, and every kind of financial aid.
GÜLEN emphasizes the importance of “Treat” in recruiting new members:
“The methods of infiltrating the soul of the students must be searched. This is a
humanitarian way of approach. It is like giving presents or solving their problems. Every
legal way to win the heart of the students must be tried and it must be achieved. I mean: the
targeted person should accept our personal friendship. This is an important factor in their
acceptance of thoughts that will be conveyed by us, and this issue must not be neglected”.
A specific monetary fund under the title “Treat and Guidance Expenses” is allocated
for student imams from the central cash deposit safe of the Organization to cover such kind
of expenses.
The first method of recruiting new members to the terrorist organizations is
approaching to a person from a low income family, or a family that does not care about
their offspring; or a broken family. These students are then convinced that they are not
alone, they belong to a group and gradually their brains are washed with the Organization
ideology.
FETÖ benefits from this need of belongingness through heavenly light houses for
recruitment. In this view; FETÖ uses similar methods in obtaining new members with other
terror Organizations.
During the process of “treat”, necessary notes about the target students are taken.
This is the step just before the youngsters who fall in FETÖ trap are invited to the FETÖ
houses. GÜLEN said; “We have to know the belief and cultural level of the students very
well. For example; we should not read even the Quran, if this is going to scare them and
make them run away from us. (…) sometimes this kind of arrangement is not made, the
words uttered for the sake of showing the true path will create a reaction on them and it is
of no use to make an explanation later”.
The most distinct characteristics of these houses are that they are far from being
transparent, secret, uncontrolled and unknown places. Code names are given to the houses
in question, to the “elder brothers” of each house and to the students staying in these houses
in order to ensure confidentiality.
GÜLEN describes the functioning of Enlightenment Houses as follows:
“These houses may also be called as charging houses. Plans and projects are
produced in these houses. The persons who are trained in these houses set sail to conquer
the world. They try to enter the hearts of the people. These houses are the places of loading
and discharging. The residents are loaded here and then they go and discharge themselves
in empty spaces and in empty bosoms. These houses are functioning like a work station, like
a Muslim theological school, and like a school to prosper and equip the template
generations who are instable, corrupt and irregular. At a time, when everywhere is closed
and every door is locked, these houses shoulder a greater mission than the one in the past.
These houses are not the ones that have just a minaret on it and where everybody goes in
when the Azan is recited, as you are accustomed to. The word “uncharted” is chosen as
word to characterize these houses. These houses are unspecific....(....). I mean, you will not
know when these houses will appear."
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The youngsters trapped in the spider’s web- in the words of GÜLEN himself- are
convinced that they are safe the responsible senior brothers guarantee that both their
education and every kind of their needs will be satisfied. Also the youngsters are explained
that their future is guaranteed by being sheltered under the wings of the Movement because
they will be placed and employed either in government institutions or private sectors to
work and make career.
There is a very strong relationship established between the senior brothers and the
youngsters under their responsibility. The senior brothers are trained in line with the tactics
underlined in the book named “İrşad Ekseni (Axis of Guidance)” by GÜLEN and then they
are assigned to establish friendship links. This process is like the training of trainers.
Following the process, the senior brothers are given weekly, monthly, quarterly, semi-
annual and annual ideological schedules and they train the target persons in line with these
schedules. The youngsters who stay in those houses are kept away from their own social
environment systemically.
This ideological training continues for five to ten years, the “militant identity” is
built.
In addition, the males that are trained in these houses are obliged to marry the
females who are also trained with the same ideology so that the Organizational links are
strengthened, since the Organization aims at establishing a permanent base and form a new
society who is inseparable and deeply loyal to each other.
The individual transformation starts with the emotional loyalty, feeling of individualism
is removed from him and then a single type militarist person emerges. GÜLEN himself
refers to them as “Privates of Hizmet Movement", "Conversation Guards" and
"Enlightenment Cavalries". Upon entering the organization, members have to pledge
their obedience to FETÖ:
I wish this swear is to be continuous and forever and swear on the name and witnessing
of Holly Allah that;
- Holly Koran will be my meaning and aim as far as I can afford.
- I will be loyal to my brothers
- I will raise the honor and dignity of my student friends and the people as high as mine.
- I will be glad in case somebody reminds me my faults.
- I will refuse various attacks and criticisms coming from in and out of the community as
they were directed towards my honor.
- I will obey the rules and procedures that are in the Decision Reports
- I will execute all the missions given to me on behalf of the service movement or my
obligations that are delivered to me by decision without any hesitation and objection.
- I will never fall away being loyal to Holly Koran.
- I will annul myself from the position I am filling and then I keep on performing my
duties as an ordinary student if I behave isolated and object to the decisions.
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The students, thus, lose all their personal freedom. They always remain to be
advised. They obey what they are told by brothers upon the belief that senior brothers
always gives the right decision.
GÜLEN emphasizes in all his conversations that the members of the organization
are the “chosen ones”, “first ones” in the eyes of God:
“I beg to Allah the Great and wish that, this "Army of the Sacred", this
"Distinguished Cadre" which prepares a new resurrection again in his world of thought,
embraces and protects the cause, with the same consciousness, and accelerates the down of
the spring promised by Allah. I wish they will not sentence us to crawl in a long tunnel for a
long time. They help us and each other to cross the tunnel quicker.”
In another occasion GÜLEN talks about his dream: “I was in front of the hell, I
opened my arms wide to stop the people who were flooding. I could not stop them and I
stepped aside at last. I swear to Allah that there was no one from our community among
them.”
The students who are brainwashed in these schools and houses are closely followed
throughout their life. All crucial decisions regarding their personal and professional life are
made by FETÖ.
• FETÖ enables these students’ admission to leading universities (in reality through
cheating in the higher education entrance examination system and entrance tests for
the military schools);
• Then, the organization secures a job for them upon graduation, (in reality through
cheating in public personnel entrance test, and special entrance examinations of
leading public institutions, armed forces academy and even that of the Turkish
Foreign Ministry);
• Then, FETÖ ensures their rapid promotion in the state institutions, (in reality
through destroying the carrier opportunities of other public servants who are not
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affiliated with them.) For instance, it is now understood that in the last 6 years
FETÖ-affiliated doctors in the military hospitals in Turkey discharged around 500
military pilots from service, by producing false reports indicating serious health
issues. By so doing, they opened the way for the promotion of Gülenist military
pilots.
• In exchange, the followers would donate 10-20 percent of their future salaries back
to FETO. They also act upon the orders of their leaders without questioning.
6. FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
During late 1960s Fetullah Gülen worked as a Preacher in İzmir, addressing the
community of a small mosque. When he first set off, he was supported by a circle of
people attracted to his dreams of raising a “Golden Generation” and his discourses “to
grand scholarships and education to the students in need”.
Initially, the financial resources necessary for his mission were provided by
contributions in kind such as animal skins, food aid, etc., or by supply of money under the
cover of “contribution to the students in need” in a traditional way such as “fitrah, alms,
donations, grants, benevolent contributions”.
Gradually as FETÖ network and financial wealth expanded, the organization started
investing in education sector. It established private schools and dormitories. It founded
companies dealing with education business and managed the schools through these
companies. After a while, the organization set up a printing house to carry out the
publications of the education sector. It opened book stores to sell the products; set up
companies in relevant fields because the schools needed uniforms and furnishing. The
expansion continued with the foundation of logistics and cargo companies, investment in
the health sector and finally FETÖ became a dominant figure in all areas of business
including in the food, textile, insurance media (Zaman, Samanyolu, etc) and banking (Bank
Asya).
The financial resources of FETÖ are derived from donations gathered from people
by exploiting their religious and charitable feelings. The organization's money and property
is collected as "himmet" generally grants, donations, contributions, offerings and aid for
students, the poor and orphans. Donors are typically unaware of how their funds are used.
Most do not reach their intended beneficiaries and are instead used to pursue the illegal
activities to subvert the state.
The tuition fees collected from the students that attend FETÖ affiliated educational
institutions in Turkey and foreign countries also have been one of the financial sources of
the organization.
In addition, the organization is financed by the fees regularly collected from the
members and affiliated entities.
Money collected by the trustees of Gülen is, then, used as seed capital for the
establishment of Gülenist firms and companies.
The main conglomorate of FETO for this operation was KAYNAK holding .
BANK ASYA was the main financial instrument of the Organization.
Companies owned or sympathetic to FETÖ were also brought under the umbrella of
TUSKON ( Turkey Businessman and Industrialists Confederation).
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The net assets of FETO-owned companies in Turkey was estimated to be at least 10
billion US Dollars, while the global capital of FETÖ is estimated to be in 50-100 billion
Dollars.
This money is managed by the organization behind the doors. These corporations,
far beyond being real actors, and instead of playing like rational actors in the free market,
carry out the instructions of the organization's "elder brothers".
The businesses that are established with seed money from and managed by the
organization also make monetary contributions to the organization.
The names of the real owners of the organization's trade corporations; unions and
foundations do not appear in the legal documents. In fact, after December 17, 2013 the
ownership of these were swiftly taken over by the undisclosed members of FETÖ in order
to decrease the visibility of the organization and move it further underground. Meanwhile,
in order to prevent the appointment of a government trustee, some members of FETÖ have
rapidly converted their possessions and assets into cash by selling their businesses. The
ownership of the companies and personal assets of the members of the organization were
then fraudulently passed to third parties to prevent seizure of the assets by the law
enforcement authorities. The acquisitions of this kind of fraudulent transactions were
transferred to third countries.
The organization also provided state funds to its own members and companies under
the name of promotion, support or premium from many of the public institutions5.
FETÖ-linked state officials abused their authority by suppressing, blackmailing and
threatening businessmen and traders, industrialists and even artists and models for funding
the FETÖ activities. They extorted money from businessmen and big companies in mafia
fashion under the cover of “benevolent contribution, scholarship or sacrifice money”. This
economic wealth acquired by deceiving people behind a religious mask, by begging, or by
using a kind of usurpation was being transferred to the organization institutions.
5 For instance: techno-cities of universities, Social Support Projects (SODES), supports of technology
and Innovation Support Programmes (TEYDEP) and Research Support Programmes (ARDEP), direct
income support in agriculture, stockbreeding supports, donations and supports given to cooperatives
and unions, health support projects were extended to the FETÖ entities without any supervision and
inspection.
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FETÖ punished businessmen who refused to make donations through extraordinary
controls, fake reports, judicial or administrative investigations. For instance, through its
members infiltrated into the judiciary and the police, it demanded donations from the
businessmen who were being investigated and promised to close down the investigation
files in return.
7. CRIMES OF THE FETÖ
Currently Fetullah Gülen himself is the prime suspect in different criminal
indictments.
The recent probes into the activities of the FETO by Public Prosecutor’s Office have
shown that under the banner of service, tolerance and humanitarian organizations, FETO
and Fetullah Gülen have established and managed an illegal organization,
• exposing confidential information belonging to state for political or military
espionage purposes,
• violating the confidentiality of private life,
• unlawful recording of personal information,
• forgery of official documents, fabricating criminal cases,
• destroying evidence,
• money laundering,
• Murder
Sham Trials of Ergenekon, Sledgehammer and Military Espionage
FETÖ used its adherents to launch judicial and administrative investigations based
on forged evidence against certain people to discredit or force them to work with them.
The involvement by the Gülenist judges and police during the Ergenekon, Balyoz
(Sledgehammer) and other high profile cases are the main examples. (For reference, an
information note on the Sledgehammer Trials is attached)
In these cases, military officials, opposition parliamentarians and journalists were
accused of plotting a violent coup to oust the government. It later turned out that these cases
were based on fabricated evidence, and that most such fabrications were produced by the
Gülenists in the police.
The Gülenist media, in particular TARAF and ZAMAN, were instrumental in
shaping the public opinion during these operations.
Cheating at the Public Service Entry Examinations
In 2010, upon the orders from Fetullah Gülen, the exam questions and answer keys
of the Public Personnel Selection Examination (KPSS) were stolen and handed out to the
certain FETO members. The members with high scores were placed strategically in the
critical state bodies. Judicial investigation into this case is continuing.
Money Laundering
Respect Institute is an entity founded by FETÖ in the USA. The Public Prosecutor
in Ankara conducted an investigation into a large scale money transfer from Turkey to
Respect Institute between 2013-2015.
The total amount in question was 2.112.332,00 US Dollars. It was transferred by
147 individuals in small installments.
The investigation revealed that the money in question was collected by FETÖ under
the guise of religious donations; the real source of the fund was not registered at the legal
authorities. Then, FETÖ transferred the money to the account of the Respect Institute in the
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United States in small installments by using the names of 147 people who worked in
different FETÖ owned companies. The installments were around 10.000-15.000 Dollars.
In some cases, the “sender” was not even aware that his name was used by the
organization.
The scheme was a typical “smurf transaction”, a method used for money laundering
purposes by criminal organizations.
Upon these findings, a judicial investigation was initiated against those involved in
the transaction. 22 people were detained.
The 15 July Coup Attempt
It is clear that FETÖ was behind the coup attempt in Turkey. It was led by a network
of military officers of varying ranks who are affiliated with the Group. It was also
supported by non-military individuals and groups known to be affiliated to Gülen.
Presence of FETO members in the military had been suspected for a long time.
Ahmet Zeki Üçok, a military prosecutor, carried out a comprehensive investigation
into the Gülenists in the armed forces in 2009. He discovered a large secret network within
the army. He identified many members of this organization by their names. However, he
could not complete his investigation as he was detained on the grounds that he tortured
certain witnesses by “hypnotizing” them and also as part of the Sledgehammer case. He
spent almost five years in prison. Immediately after the botched coup attempt, he publicly
declared that the leaders of the coup matched perfectly the list that he had prepared in 2009.
Referring to the F-16s that bombed the Turkish parliament he recalled the words of now-
retired Col. Selçuk Başyiğit, : “We are now very strong. We have F-16s, F-4s that will take
off with a single order of Fethullah Gülen.” Üçok’s findings were corroborated by many
soldiers who fought against the coup attempt or by those soldiers who were the victims of
the Sledgehammer case.
There are other crucial findings pointing to direct FETÖ involvement in the coup
attempt.
Testimony of Chief of General Staff
On the night of 15 July, as the coup was progressing, Gülenist officers leading the
coup urged General Hulusi Akar, Chief of General Staff, to speak directly to Fethullah
Gülen, hoping to persuade him to join them, according to General Akar.
Testimony of Lt. Col. Levent Türkkan, aide-de-camp of the Chief of General Staff
Lt. Col. Levent Türkkan has been the aide of the Chief of General Staff Gen. Hulusi
Akar and the former Chief of Staff for many years. On the eve of the coup plot, he was
among those plotters who apprehended General Akar forcefully at the General Staff
Headquarters.
After the coup was thwarted, Lt. Col. Türkkan was taken into detention. In his
testimony, he has confessed his affiliation with the Fethullah Gülen group and explained in
detail how the coup attempt was orchestrated.
According to his testimony, he confessed being a member of the Gülen Movement
since young age.
He passed the military school examinations in 1989, with the help of the
organization that provided the test questions to him one night before the examination.
He obeyed the orders of FETO after becoming the aid to the top military
commander, such as wiretapping both the present and former Chiefs of Staff on a regular
basis.
He revealed the names of other Gülen-linked officers, including the Chief of the
Cabinet who actively took part in the coup attempt.
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Presence of Gülen-linked civilians at the Akıncılar Air base in Ankara during the plot
attempt
The prosecutors have submitted their indictment regarding plotters who have played
an active role at the center of the coup attempt, Akincilar air base near Ankara.
In the indictment, it was established that at least four civilians were present at the
Akıncılar military base on the night of 15 July:
• Adil Öksüz, a professor of theology, known to be the “imam” of FETO for the
airforce.
• Kemal Batmaz, CEO of a Gülenist company
• Hakan Çiçek, owner of FETO-affiliated school in Ankara.
• Harun Biniş, former employee at the Information and Communication Technology
Authority, who was, then, accused of wiretapping the phones of senior government
officials
• Nurettin Oruç, “filmproducer”
Adil Öksüz and Fetullah Gülen
Their images were captured by the security cameras at the Akıncılar air base.
Prosecutors also revealed that Adil Öksüz and Kemal Batmaz travelled several to the
US ih 2015 and 2016, latest one being on 11-13 July, just two days before the coup attempt.
Before each US visit, Adil Öksüz travelled to Ankara to hold meetings with the Gülenist
officers in the army. Locations of these secret meetings in Ankara have been established by
the prosecutors.
Former police officials who were dismissed due to their links with Gülen participated
in the plot
There are concrete findings that on the night of 15 July, some police officials who
were previously dismissed from the Turkish national police because of their affiliation with
the Gülen group, actively participated in the coup attempt together with the military
plotters.
During the course of the coup attempt, there was intense communication between
the military plotters and those police officers.
During the coup attempt, several ex-police officers were seen on locations in
proximity to critical locations such as the TRT (Turkish Radio and TV institution) and the
Police Intelligence Headquarters in Ankara. One of them was captured. His telephone
records revealed several WhatsApp correspondences between the FETÖ members,
including orders to support the coup attempt.
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Gülen Aktepe had been the deputy in the intelligence department of the Turkish
Police until he was suspended of his duty in 2014. He was captured while trying to take
over the National Police HQ with the army officers on the night of the failed coup. Aktepe
said he received a message that read: "The coup has taken place. For assistance, everyone
must go near to the places they used to previously work." Aktepe said the FETÖ provided
him with 4,500 TL (around $1400) every month after he was dismissed from his position.
There were similar cases in Istanbul. Mithat Aynacı was a police chief in Istanbul
until 2013, when he was dismissed for his role in the two FETO-linked investigations
against several government officials and politicians. When tanks were heading to Istanbul
police headquarters, Aynacı was found in one of the tanks. A video recording shows
Aynacı, wearing a military officer uniform, entering the tank, and another one shows him
forcefully pulled from the tank