38/31 Situation in Kasaï - Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

GE.18-10936 (E) 240718 250718



Human Rights Council Thirty-eighth session

18 June–6 July 2018

Agenda item 4

Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention

Situation in Kasaï*

Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has the honour of

sending the Human Rights Council the report of the team of international experts on the

situation in Kasaï, in accordance with resolution 35/33 of the Human Rights Council.

* The present report was submitted late in order to include recently received information.

United Nations A/HRC/38/31

General Assembly Distr.: General 3 July 2018

English

Original: French

2 GE.18-10936

Report of the team of international experts on the situation in Kasaï

Summary

The team of international experts is shocked by the extent of the violence that has

killed thousands and by the catastrophic human rights situation that has prevailed in the

Kasaï region since 2016. The present report sets out information on just a small portion of

the acts and crimes that have been committed. The team is also concerned about the low

level of attention given to this tragedy and the lack of means engaged to bring it to an end.

The team confirms that the defence and security forces, the Kamuina Nsapu militia

and the Bana Mura militias have committed numerous atrocities, including many cases of

sexual violence and abusive treatment of children that can be qualified as crimes against

humanity or war crimes.

The team is deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation, with the

displacement of an estimated 1.4 million people, whose situation remains extremely

precarious.

In the light of the magnitude and gravity of the crimes that have been committed,

there remains a very serious problem of impunity. A serious judicial investigation must be

carried out for the perpetrators of these crimes to be brought to justice and judged and for

the rights of the victims to be restored.

GE.18-10936 3

Contents

Page

I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 4

II. Terms of reference ........................................................................................................................ 4

III. Methodology and standard of proof .............................................................................................. 4

IV. Applicable law .............................................................................................................................. 5

V. Background ................................................................................................................................... 5

VI. Parties involved in the crisis .......................................................................................................... 6

A. Defence and security forces .................................................................................................. 6

B. Kamuina Nsapu militia ......................................................................................................... 7

C. Bana Mura militias ............................................................................................................... 8

VII. Establishment of the facts and circumstances ............................................................................... 8

A. April–August 2016: Beginning of the violence in Dibaya territory, Kasaï Central .............. 8

B. September–December 2016: Spread of the Kamuina Nsapu movement to the

provinces of Kasaï Central, Kasaï Oriental and Kasaï .......................................................... 9

C. January–July 2017: Eruption of violence throughout Kasaï and the ethnic dimension

of the conflict ........................................................................................................................ 10

VIII. Consequences of the Kasaï crisis and the current situation ........................................................... 15

IX. Legal characterization ................................................................................................................... 16

A. Crimes against humanity ...................................................................................................... 16

B. War crimes ............................................................................................................................ 16

C. Human rights violations ........................................................................................................ 17

X. Conclusions and recommendations ............................................................................................... 17

A. Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 17

B. Recommendations ................................................................................................................. 18

Annex

Map of Kasaï ................................................................................................................................. 20

4 GE.18-10936

I. Introduction

1. In response to the wave of violence sweeping Kasaï since 2016, the Human Rights

Council on 23 June 2017 decided unanimously, by its resolution 35/33, to establish a team

of international experts on the situation in Kasaï, for a period of one year.

2. On 26 July 2017, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

appointed Bacre Waly Ndiaye of Senegal (Chairman), Fatimata M’Baye of Mauritania and

Luc Côté of Canada as international experts. They were assisted by a secretariat set up by

the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and

based in Kananga, Kasaï Central Province.

3. In March 2018, the team of international experts presented an oral report to the

Human Rights Council.

4. The team would like to thank the Democratic Republic of the Congo for its

cooperation and for facilitating access to the country. It expresses its thanks to the United

Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

(MONUSCO) for its support, as well as to United Nations bodies, including OHCHR and

the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-

Women), and the governmental and non-governmental organizations that provided it with

their cooperation. Lastly, and above all, it thanks the victims and witnesses who agreed to

tell their stories.

II. Terms of reference

5. In accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 35/33, the team of international

experts was assigned the tasks of collecting and preserving information, determining the

facts and circumstances of presumed violations of human rights and international

humanitarian law in Kasaï and communicating the conclusions of this investigation to the

judicial authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in order to establish the truth

and ensure that the perpetrators of deplorable crimes are all held accountable to before the

country’s judicial authorities.

6. The team believes that its terms of reference were to establish the facts and

circumstances of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed

to date and since 2016 in the provinces of Kasaï, Kasaï Central, Kasaï Oriental, Lomami

and Sankuru1 likely to constitute crimes under international criminal law. In the light of the

broad terms of reference given to the team and the time frame it was assigned, the team

gave priority to investigating the most serious acts of violence, such as attacks on the right

to life and physical integrity, and specifically sexual violence, gender-based violence and

violence committed against children.

7. The team also considers that its mandate is to examine the roles of all the parties

involved in the wave of violence that has affected Kasaï since 2016, including the defence

and security forces, the Kamuina Nsapu militia and the Bana Mura militias.

III. Methodology and standard of proof

8. The international team of experts collected information from many sources on the

wave of violence. It established a selection methodology concentrating on the most serious

and symptomatic incidents, and it conducted interviews with 524 victims, witnesses,

presumed perpetrators and other sources. Documents, photographs and videos were

collected in support of the testimonies.

1 In the present report, “Kasaï” or “the provinces of Kasaï” refer to those five provinces, while “Kasai

Province” refers specifically to the province of that name.

GE.18-10936 5

9. The team encountered various obstacles to the effective conduct of its investigation.

The vast size of the territory in question, coupled with the fact that access to witnesses was

difficult owing to road conditions and security issues, presented daily challenges. Delays in

deploying the team in the field also posed challenges.

10. The team adopted the same standard of proof as the majority of international

commissions of inquiry and other fact-finding missions, namely, that there should be

“reasonable grounds to believe”, meaning that corroborating information must be received

from at least two sources.

11. The team incorporated a gender perspective in all its work and paid special attention

to allegations of sexual and gender-based violence. In addition, it also established an

investigation methodology adapted to the specific needs of minors.

12. Notwithstanding the fact that procedures were set up in line with best practices for

witness protection and confidentiality, a number of witnesses expressed concern about the

sharing of their testimonies when they related to acts of violence committed by the defence

and security forces or by their own communities.

IV. Applicable law

13. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is inter alia a party to the International

Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination; the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its first Optional Protocol; the International

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of

All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the Convention against Torture and Other

Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its Optional Protocol; and the

Convention on the Rights of the Child and its first two Optional Protocols. It is also a party

to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and its protocol concerning the rights

of women in Africa and the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes

Region and its various protocols.

14. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a party to the four Geneva Conventions of

1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977, as well as to the Rome Statute of the

International Criminal Court, whose definitions of international crimes were recently

incorporated into the country’s Criminal Code.

15. The international team of experts has also considered Congolese national law, in

particular the safeguards for human rights included in the Constitution.

V. Background

16. Since July 2015, the Kasaï region has consisted of five provinces: Kasaï, Kasaï

Central, Kasaï Oriental, Lomami and Sankuru.2 Kasaï is one of the least developed regions

of the country. Despite an abundance of natural resources, the economy has been in ruins

for several decades. Extreme poverty and chronic underdevelopment have persisted because

of the very low level of State investment in the region’s basic services.

17. The Kasaï region, whose population is mostly Luba, has traditionally been a

stronghold of the main opposition party, the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social,

which explains in part why the region is marginalized at the national level. A wave of

violence erupted in Kasaï in 2016 in a national context of tension related to the presidential

election. In December 2016, the presidential majority and the political opposition signed an

agreement calling for a presidential election by the end of 2017 and prohibiting President

Kabila from running for a third term. Yet in 2017 it became clear that the election would

not take place by the end of the year as stipulated in the agreement. Demonstrations calling

for the agreement to be respected were forbidden or suppressed in several cities. The Kasaï

region was not particularly affected by the demonstrations. While it may be difficult to

2 Redistricting, called for by the Constitution, was implemented in July 2015.

6 GE.18-10936

conclude that national politics had nothing to do with the authorities’ reaction in handling

the Kasaï crisis, there is little proof of a direct link between the wave of violence in Kasaï

and the electoral process.

18. In the run-up to independence, violence had broken out within the Luba population.

The Luba people share a common language, Tshiluba, and at this juncture they are

relatively united. On the other hand, with the division of the former Province of Kasaï

Occidental into two new provinces in 2015, tensions grew between Luba groups and

Chokwe and Pende people, who live in the southern and eastern parts of Kasaï Province.

While Kasaï Central remains dominated by the Luba population, the Luba have lost

influence in Kasaï Province to the Chokwe and the Pende. It is also impossible to consider

the crisis in the Kasaïs in isolation from pre-existing local conflicts involving customary

chiefs and the sharing of land and mining resources.

19. Customary authority, which is closely linked to ethnic identity, is an important part

of the local power system. Customary chiefs, in addition to performing important spiritual

functions, play a major role in public administration, village management and access to

land and local justice. They are named according to traditional customs and are

subsequently recognized by the public authorities, who pay them a salary. While the role of

customary chief is supposed to be apolitical, the State authorities regularly bring pressure to

bear on the chiefs to encourage them to fall into line politically with the provincial and

national authorities, going so far as to refuse to recognize those who nonetheless have been

named through the traditional practice.

20. Belief in witchcraft and supernatural powers remains widespread in society,

including in the defence and security forces. Jujus are given a great deal of importance. A

large number of customary rules govern the life of the community, and breaking them can

lead to serious consequences.

VI. Parties involved in the crisis

A. Defence and security forces

21. The Democratic Republic of the Congo has still not been able to establish a well-

organized, professional army. The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

(FARDC) continue to commit frequent and serious human rights violations against civilians

and to live off the civilian population.

22. When the crisis began in Kasaï, soldiers of the 2101st regiment were stationed in

Kananga. They reported to the 21st military region, based in Mbuji-Mayi, Kasaï Oriental.

The regiment, which had been under the fifth integrated brigade, was composed of a mix of

reintegrated former militia members and troops of the national army. The presence in the

regiment of Kinyarwanda-speaking military personnel from the eastern part of the country

was hotly criticized by Chief Kamuina Nsapu, who accused them of being foreigners. Some

military commanders had reportedly been involved in serious human rights violations in

other parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

23. FARDC initially reacted with brutality against the Kamuina Nsapu militia. Despite

the arrival of reinforcements at the end of 2016, which brought the number of military

personnel in Kasaï to 7,000, FARDC failed to stop the rapid expansion of the militia. On 9

March 2017, the Government established the Greater Kasaï Operations Sector, with its

command centre in Kananga, in order to confront the Kamuina Nsapu militia, which the

Government qualified as terrorists. In the territory of Kamonia, in Kasaï Province, FARDC

conducted operations with the support of the Bana Mura militia. Towards the end of 2017,

the authorities started to reduce the number of troops in Kasaï.

24. The Congolese National Police clearly lacked equipment and training to respond to

the violence in Kasaï, despite the arrival of a unit of reinforcements specialized in

maintaining order.

GE.18-10936 7

B. Kamuina Nsapu militia

25. The Kamuina Nsapu militia, which is mostly Luba, emerged owing to a customary

power struggle. Following the death of the former Kamuina Nsapu chief, Ntuma Mupala,

chief of the Bajila-Kasanga clan in Dibaya territory of Kasaï Central Province, Jean-Prince

Mpandi was named as successor. The Bajila-Kasanga chieftainship belongs to the

Bashilange federal kingdom, whose chiefs since the colonial period have ruled all the way

to neighbouring Angola. The Kamuina Nsapu chief is the military leader of the Bashilange

kingdom.

26. Mr. Mpandi’s request to be recognized as the Kamuina Nsapu customary chief was

denied by the Minister of the Interior, Évariste Boshab, for political reasons. The authorities

tried to support Ntenda Tshiambi, the customary chief of the village of Ntenda and a rival

of Mr. Mpandi, who was politically close to the then-Governor of Kasaï Central, Alex

Kande.

27. On 3 April 2016, Mr. Mpandi’s home was searched, in his absence, for weapons.

This incident reportedly exacerbated his animosity against the authorities and his rival, Mr.

Tshiambi, whom he suspected of being behind the search.

28. Upon his return from South Africa Mr. Mpandi accused the authorities of

desecrating his jujus and of attempting to sexually abuse his wife. He thus announced that

he would set up a “political and customary” movement on the basis of the practices and

legitimacy of customary power and the system of traditional beliefs. His movement

opposed the State authorities and “foreigners” who were responsible, in his view, for

harassing the people and for the lack of economic opportunity.

29. In his village and Dibaya territory, Kamuina Nsapu, the customary chief, recruited

militia members, the majority of whom were children, and in June 2016 began to set up

barriers to control movement by State officials. The first armed attack by the Kamuina

Nsapu militia was directed against the village of the rival chief, Mr. Tshiambi. Later, the

militia attacked symbols of the State in Dibaya territory. As efforts by the political

authorities to find a negotiated solution with the Kamuina Nsapu customary chief were

ineffective, the authorities quickly opted for the use of force.

30. On 12 August 2016, the Kamuina Nsapu chief was killed in an attack on his village

by the defence and security forces, and his body was transported to Kananga, provoking

indignation among the Bashilange. The fact that the Kamuina Nsapu family was part of the

kingdom of Bashilange led to the rapid expansion of the militia. Thanks to an organized

recruitment system and the placement of tshiotas (initiation halls containing sacred fires),

the militia spread. Emissaries of the late Kamuina Nsapu, sometimes called “apostles”,

travelled from village to village in an ever expanding area to set up their tshiotas,

beheading village chiefs who opposed their movement. Tshiotas were thus set up in the five

provinces of Kasaï. Villagers were called upon to voluntarily join the movement. Those

who refused were often beheaded.

31. In the tshiotas, in the presence of an “apostle” or a high-level chief often called the

“president”, the recruits, including young children, had to subject themselves to a “baptism”

ritual, which involved drinking an alcoholic mixture and performing other rites. Once this

was done, the recruits were part of the militia, where ancestral beliefs and rituals played an

extremely important role. In order to ensure that militia members would be invincible

against firearms, these beliefs required the observance of strict rules. The tshiotas were also

favoured as places for beheadings, often performed by children, as well as for acts of

cannibalism. Heads and other body parts of victims of attacks were brought there, along

with their blood.

32. Units were organized and attacks were planned as well in the tshiotas. Before

clashes, the militia members took part in rituals involving the swallowing of alcoholic

mixtures. Typically, when the fighting occurred, the Kamuina Nsapu militia was deployed

with one or more girls called “ya mama” in the front line. According to their beliefs, they

had the power to catch firearm projectiles with their skirts. Just behind them were boys

armed with knives and sticks. According to the beliefs, they had the magical power to

8 GE.18-10936

transform into lethal weapons. Older militia members with better equipment such as

traditional firearms or hunting weapons, and sometimes with automatic weapons, followed

in the last line.

33. The number of militia members in an operational group varied but was generally

between 15 and 30, most of whom were children. At the head of each group was a

“general” or “capita” During the operations, the Kamuina Nsapu militia almost always

wore the same distinctive clothing: Red headbands, with small knives and jujus around the

neck. The Kamuina Nsapu militia managed in a very short time to recruit militia members,

carry out attacks in the five provinces of Kasaï and take control of villages and towns for

several weeks or even months at a time.

34. Since 2017, the militia has become increasingly violent and its attacks have taken on

an ethnic character outside areas where the language of the Luba people is spoken.

C. Bana Mura militias

35. The Bana Mura militias are made up mostly of Chokwe men, but also include some

Pende and Tetela men. They were set up in February and March 2017 in certain parts of the

Kamonia territory and the town of Tshikapa, in Kasaï Province, in response to the attacks

by the Kamuina Nsapu militia, which is Luba, against Chokwe and Pende people.

36. The Bana Mura militiamen had connections with certain representatives of the State.

In the town of Kamonia, meetings were held between political and security authorities and

local chiefs in order to set up militia groups. Some local leaders, in particular the chief of

the village of Muyeji, played an important role in the organization of the Bana Mura

militias. While it is difficult to find a shared chain of command, there were links between

the various Bana Mura militias. For example, weapons distributions organized by the local

authorities took place in several parts of the territory of Kamonia.

37. The Bana Mura militiamen were for the most part locally recruited young men

between the ages of 18 and 22. The militiamen often had new weapons (machetes and

hunting rifles).

38. The operations carried out by the Bana Mura militias were particularly violent and

were often conducted with the defence and security forces, and sometimes under their

command. In other cases, the Bana Mura militias operated alone, with the defence and

security forces refraining from intervening to stop the violence and help the victims.

Recently, the defence and security forces have sometimes engaged the Bana Mura militias.

VII. Establishment of the facts and circumstances

A. April–August 2016: Beginning of the violence in Dibaya territory, Kasaï Central

39. The search of the home of the customary chief, Kamuina Nsapu, on 3 April 2016

and the subsequent establishment of his “political and customary” movement, followed by

the recruitment of militia members, marked the onset of the violence in Dibaya territory of

Kasaï Central. Between May and August 2016, several hundred militia members, for the

most part girls and boys, were thus recruited in his village and in Dibaya territory.

40. Beginning in June, the Kamuina Nsapu militia set up barriers around the village of

Kamuina Nsapu to control the movement of the police, the military and other

representatives of the State. On 22 July, a first attack was launched against symbols of the

State, leading to the destruction of the police station in the village of Mfuamba. The next

day, the village of the Ntenda customary chief, who was in conflict with the Kamuina

Nsapu customary chief, was attacked. This was the first deadly attack by the militia, and it

left at least six dead, four persons with bullet wounds and over a hundred houses burned.

GE.18-10936 9

41. The Kamuina Nsapu customary chief then led a series of attacks in Dibaya territory,

in particular against the towns and villages of Mfuamba, Bukonde, Tshikula, Dibaya and

Tshimbulu. These assaults led to the destruction and looting of public buildings and similar

structures and to attacks against persons representing or considered to represent the public

authorities. Officers of the Congolese National Police were the main victims of these

attacks. The deadliest raid was against the town of Tshimbulu. It was ordered by the

Kamuina Nsapu chief and left at least five police officers and five militiamen dead.

42. Following the failure of mediation efforts by the authorities, a major military

operation was launched to halt the advance of the militia. With the arrival of military

reinforcements in Kananga, the operation was aimed at taking Dibaya territory by attacking

on several fronts that were opened on the main roads, the final destination being the village

of the Kamuina Nsapu chief. Between 10 and 12 August, violent clashes took place

between FARDC and the Kamuina Nsapu militia, in particular in Tshimbulu, Dibaya,

Tshikula, Sampi, Bitanda and Kabunji. The armed forces fired on the militia members,

including many unarmed children, including with the use of rocket launchers. There were

also dead and wounded among the members of the armed forces.

43. On 12 August, the defence and security forces led an operation to kill the Kamuina

Nsapu customary chief in his native village. Following clashes that left several dead, the

customary chief was shot dead by FARDC, and his body was moved to Kananga.

44. Fighting between the Kamuina Nsapu militia and the defence and security forces

continued in Dibaya territory. In mid-August, for instance, in front of the Tshikula Catholic

Mission, FARDC fired indiscriminately at civilians and Kamuina Nsapu militia members,

many of whom were children, causing dozens of casualties. Some of the bodies were

stacked onto trucks and transported to the Kananga Officer Training School for burial.

B. September–December 2016: Spread of the Kamuina Nsapu movement to the provinces of Kasaï Central, Kasaï Oriental and Kasaï

45. The death of the Kamuina Nsapu customary chief did not bring the violence in Kasaï

to an end. On the contrary, beginning in September 2016, the Kamuina Nsapu militia

quickly spread further afield. While remaining active in Dibaya territory, the militia

expanded into other territories of Kasaï Central and into Kasaï Oriental beginning in

September/October 2016. By the end of November, it reached Kamonia territory, in Kasaï

Province, along the Kananga-Tshikapa road.

1. Kasaï Central Province

46. On 22 and 23 September 2016, the Kamuina Nsapu militia attacked the airport in

Kananga. A female employee of Congo Airways, several soldiers and many militiamen

were killed in clashes with FARDC. The Kamuina Nsapu militiamen burned down

buildings in the vicinity of the airport. Subsequently, FARDC fired rocket-propelled

grenades into the neighbourhoods near the airport, resulting in the death of civilians, whose

bodies were transported to the Officer Training School.

47. At the end of September, in operations to track down the militia, the armed forces

wounded, raped and killed civilians in Kananga and in nearby villages such as Mwamba-

Mbuyi and Tshimpidinga.

48. In Dibaya territory, the violence continued between September and December. On 8

December, for instance, the Kamuina Nsapu militia set fire to the headquarters of the

Congolese National Police in the village of Bukonde and hacked a member of the National

Intelligence Agency to death in a machete attack. Villagers were also beaten and wounded

with machete blows. FARDC arrived the next day and engaged the militia, killing many

militia members, including children. The FARDC members who remained in Bukonde after

the clashes looted houses and killed at least one civilian.

10 GE.18-10936

2. Kasaï Oriental Province

49. In October 2016, the Kamuina Nsapu movement spread to Kasaï Oriental. Violent

acts occurred in several villages in Kabeya-Kamwanga territory until April 2017. For

example, on 13 October 2016, after two members of the militia were executed by the

defence and security forces in Kena Nkuna, about 100 Kamuina Nsapu militia members,

most of whom were children, entered the town and burned down public buildings and

similar structures. FARDC thereupon arrived and clashes took place throughout the day,

leaving several dead among the militia members and the civilian population. On 15 October

FARDC launched a “door-to-door” operation to search for militia members, and several

civilians were executed. In the following weeks, the armed forces raped and executed

civilians and systematically looted and destroyed homes.

50. Violent acts were committed in several villages in Miabi territory, in Kasaï Oriental.

For example, on 18 December 2016, members of FARDC clashed with Kamuina Nsapu

militiamen in the village of Mwanza Lomba. They opened fire on militiamen carrying

sticks and knives, killing and wounding several people, including women and children, and

then executing the wounded who had fallen. After that incident was covered by the media,

eight of the nine soldiers tried for these crimes were convicted in July 2017.

3. Kasaï Province

51. The wave of violence linked to the Kamuina Nsapu movement reached the

Kananga-Tshikapa road, in Kamonia territory, Kasaï province, between late November and

early December 2016. As a result of a customary power struggle, a chief who was not

recognized by the authorities visited Kasaï Central Province with the aim of returning with

the Kamuina Nsapu jujus. In line with the usual pattern, children were recruited into the

militia, and some village chiefs who refused to pledge support were beheaded.

52. The first incident in Kamonia territory took place on 28 November, when two

policemen were killed by Kamuina Nsapu militiamen in the Mbawu communities. On 4 and

5 December, many militia members, including girls and boys, entered the town of

Tshikapa. Clashes took place near the Kasaï bridge, in the Kele neighbourhood and around

the airfield near the town centre.

53. After this attack, FARDC conducted reprisals in villages of the Mbawu communities

and along the Kananga-Tshikapa road; many civilians were shot to death by the armed

forces, including in the villages of Mfuamba, Mbawu and Kabeya-Lumbu. On 6 December

the armed forces arrived in large numbers in the village of Tshitadi, where there were no

militiamen present. They burned many houses down and opened fire on the population,

killing dozens of men, women and children.

C. January–July 2017: Eruption of violence throughout Kasaï and the ethnic dimension of the conflict

54. From January to July 2017, the Kamuina Nsapu movement and its militia continued

to advance with the aim of reaching all provinces of Kasaï. Military reinforcements were

sent and a military operations sector was established in early March 2017. Both the level of

violence associated with the clashes and the number of abuses committed by the Kamuina

Nsapu militia and the defence and security forces against civilians increased exponentially,

peaking between January and May. Moreover, from March onwards, the conflict took on a

pronounced ethnic dimension in Kamonia territory, in Kasaï Province, with the arrival of

the Kamuina Nsapu militia in non-Luba-speaking areas and the emergence of the Bana

Mura militias.

1. Kasaï Central Province

(a) Dibaya territory

55. There has been an upsurge in violence in Dibaya territory, the home of the Kamuina

Nsapu movement. On 5 January 2017, following incursions by members of the Kamuina

GE.18-10936 11

Nsapu militia in Tshimbulu, which had resulted in the destruction of the police station and

the death of a policeman, FARDC soldiers arrived to confront them. More than 20 members

of the militia, most of whom were children armed with sticks, were killed by firearms and

rocket launchers; some militia members were killed while lying on the ground. Local

residents were also injured or killed by projectiles. At least three other clashes took place in

Tshimbulu, including on 10 February, when at least 100 people were killed. The FARDC

soldiers raped women and girls, looted property and burned down houses.

56. Similar incidents took place in a large number of villages in the territory, including

Bukonde, Dibaya, Kabeya-Madi, Bena Kalegna, Muan Mukaya, Kazadi, Kaulu, Lumbudi,

Lubondaye and Lubi. Rape, often gang rape, looting, destruction of property and homes and

summary executions committed by FARDC were documented there. For the first time, the

Kamuina Nsapu militia attacked the civilian population of this territory.

57. Two members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo

established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1533 (2004), Zaida Catalán, a dual

Swedish and Chilean citizen, and Michael Sharp, a United States citizen, were killed near

the village of Bukonde on 12 March. Ms. Catalán’s body was decapitated. Their four

companions from the Democratic Republic of the Congo are still missing. Judicial

proceedings are ongoing.

(b) Town of Kananga

58. In the town of Kananga, several tshiotas were erected by the Kamuina Nsapu militia,

of which at least three were located in the commune of Nganza. Many children, both boys

and girls, were recruited in the first few months of 2017. Multiple clashes took place in the

town between the militia and the defence and security forces between January and April,

resulting in the death of several hundred people.

59. On the night of 14 March, FARDC launched a planned attack on three tshiotas in the

commune of Nganza where hundreds of Kamuina Nsapu militia members, mostly children

aged 8 and over, were sleeping. The FARDC soldiers used firearms and rocket launchers,

causing many casualties among the militia members. They also killed injured children,

sometimes with knives. The bodies were stacked onto trucks and taken away by the

soldiers.

60. Between 28 and 30 March, FARDC launched “door-to-door” operations in the

commune of Nganza, during which many civilians, men, women and children, were

wounded or killed indiscriminately. Young children were slaughtered in their sleep. Some

bodies were taken away by FARDC, while others were buried in several mass graves by

soldiers or local residents.

(c) Kazumba territory

61. A number of isolated incidents were documented in Kazumba territory: on 10 and 11

March 2017, members of the Kamuina Nsapu militia attacked Notre-Dame du Kasaï

Cathedral, located on Malandji Hill, stripping and beating several of the clergy and cutting

off the parish carpenter’s right hand. On 30 April, the militia executed six members of a

delegation of national school inspectors, near Kafumba. On 7 May, FARDC executed at

least 79 people, including 19 children, and raped 4 women at the Tshikulu village market.

(d) Luiza territory

62. All parts of Luiza territory were the scene of acts of violence between late January

and July 2017. The Kamuina Nsapu militia arrived in the territory in late January from

Dibaya territory. The militia was under the command of a Kamuina Nsapu chief and an

associate, both of whom were from Dibaya. The chief set up several tshiotas, including two

large ones in the villages of Kitoko and Yangala, and travelled to the various villages in the

territory to convince the village chiefs to join the movement or to force them to do so.

Those who refused were beheaded. In the villages where they were met with hostility, the

militia members retaliated against the inhabitants by looting and burning down their homes.

Several hundred girls and boys were recruited into the militia, including in the villages of

12 GE.18-10936

Kitoko, Moma, Kadongo, Masuika, Mubinza and Tulume. The children were promised free

schooling for anyone who killed soldiers.

63. In addition to attacks against property and persons that were symbols of State

authority or perceived as such, the militia also committed abusive acts against civilians.

Those inhabitants who did not respect the rules imposed by the militia were “tried” in the

tshiotas before being beaten or beheaded. Rape, sometimes in front of the victims’ children,

was committed in several villages, including Muzodi, Masuika and Kamayi. The Catholic

Church, which had been largely spared in the past, was a prime target for the militia in

Luiza territory, and much of its property and buildings were destroyed. Many schools were

also destroyed by the militia, including in Kamushilu, Kadongo and Malambo.

64. Between 3 and 5 February, several violent clashes between the Kamuina Nsapu

militia members, the majority of whom were children, and FARDC took place in the village

of Nguema, resulting in the death of several dozen militia members. From that point until

mid-July, numerous skirmishes took place, including in the villages of Musefu, Kadongo,

Masuika, Mubinza, Lumpungu, Kalemba Mbuji, Tulume and Yangala. Hundreds of

Kamuina Nsapu militia members, including children, were killed in those clashes, and

many civilians lost their lives as a result of the indiscriminate use of force by FARDC. On 7

April, FARDC opened fire indiscriminately on the inhabitants of the village of Muzodi,

killing some 20 villagers. Rape, including gang rape, was committed by members of

FARDC, including in the villages of Kadongo, Masuika and Yangala. FARDC set fire to

every village that they stopped in to drive out the militia, including Kadongo, Moma,

Masuika, Yangala and Masala; FARDC destroyed several dozen villages and burned down

several thousand homes.

2. Lomami Province

65. In this province, the Kamuina Nsapu militia systematically recruited new members

by force. Those who refused to join the movement, including children, were beheaded.

Members of the militia raped women, thus breaking their own rules prohibiting such

behaviour.

3. Kasaï Province

66. While in Kasaï Central the Kamuina Nsapu militia had mainly attacked symbols of

State power, in Kasaï Province, their target was the non-Luba-speaking population,

particularly in Luebo and Kamonia territories.

(a) Luebo territory

67. The Kamuina Nsapu movement emerged in Luebo territory in December 2016,

primarily in the village of Konyi. A Kamuina Nsapu chief recruited militia members,

including children, and ordered the construction of several tshiotas in the territory.

68. The Kamuina Nsapu militia first attempted to take control of Luebo town in early

March 2017, but it was caught by FARDC ambushes. At least 20 bodies of civilians,

including those of women and children, were discovered after the clashes at the entrance to

the town.

69. On the morning of 31 March, after FARDC had left the town, several hundred

Kamuina Nsapu militia members entered without resistance and took control. The militia

members were armed with sticks, knives, machetes, some shotguns and, in some cases,

weapons of war. Most public buildings and those belonging to the Catholic Church, as well

as several schools, were destroyed or burned down. At least four civilians were killed.

70. The Kamuina Nsapu militia set up a tshiota in the centre of Luebo. Several chiefs

from communities in Luebo territory took turns in controlling the town, and rules were

imposed on its inhabitants. On 9 April, members of the Kamuina Nsapu militia forced a

female restaurateur and her husband’s son to have sex in public before killing and

beheading them. The same day, an officer of the Congolese National Police and two others

were also beheaded. Rape was also committed by members of the militia in early April.

GE.18-10936 13

71. Around 16 April, FARDC retook the town after several violent clashes during which

many Kamuina Nsapu child militiamen and civilians lost their lives. FARDC then

destroyed and burned down villages in the vicinity of the town of Luebo where there were

concentrations of militia, killing civilians in the process. Several mass graves were

identified. The clashes in Luebo territory reportedly left at least 770 people dead, including

350 women and 420 men, and 208 people injured.

(b) Kamonia territory: Tshikapa-Kananga road

72. Between January and June 2017, the Kamuina Nsapu militia remained particularly

active on the Tshikapa-Kananga road. Around 24 March, 37 officers of the national police

and 2 members of FARDC were killed and, in some cases, beheaded by the militia in the

village of Malenga. A large amount of weapons and ammunition was also seized by the

militia.

73. FARDC used excessive means to stop the Kamuina Nsapu militia, resulting in the

death of many civilians, particularly in and around Mbawu and in the villages of Kabeya-

Lumbu and Kamuesha.

(c) Tshikapa town

74. Between February and June 2017, acts of violence took place in the town of

Tshikapa, where inhabitants live in neighbourhoods divided along ethnic lines.

75. In March, the Kamuina Nsapu militia beheaded several officers of the Congolese

National Police, including a commander. The level of violence used by the militia against

civilians subsequently increased and beheadings, mutilation and rape, which often took the

form of gang rape and was so violent that some women died as a result of their ordeal, were

committed in the town of Tshikapa and in the surrounding villages.

76. Several clashes between FARDC and the Kamuina Nsapu militia took place in

Tshikapa in March and April in the vicinity of the general hospital and in the communes of

Kele and Kanzala. FARDC made no distinction between militia members and inhabitants as

it wounded and killed Luba-speaking civilians. In addition, soldiers broke into inhabitants’

homes at night and committed serious abuses against them. They beheaded men, raped

numerous women and girls, abducted young girls and even disembowelled a pregnant

woman.

77. From April onwards, some of the Chokwe and Pende civilians in the town, for

whom the Luba ethnic group was identified with the Kamuina Nsapu militia, carried out

night-time reprisals against homes in predominantly Luba-speaking neighbourhoods,

committing murder and burning down houses.

(d) Southern part of Kamonia territory

78. The Kamuina Nsapu militia entered the southern part of Kamonia territory, thus

advancing into predominantly Chokwe areas. It became very active there from March 2017,

particularly on the Mutena-Kamako road and along the border with Angola.

79. Between March and May, the Kamuina Nsapu militia was active in the town of

Kamako. On 6 March, it made its first incursion and attacked the headquarters of the

Congolese National Police, killing two or three officers. In response, the Congolese

National Police arrested and unlawfully detained civilians, subjected them to inhuman

treatment and summarily executed at least three of them. On 13 April, a large number of

Kamuina Nsapu militia members took control of the town and recruited many children,

both girls and boys. They beheaded at least 40 people in the tshiota, including a police

colonel, State officials and persons accused of theft or witchcraft.

80. On 1 May, FARDC entered Kamako and regained control after violent clashes that

left at least 50 people dead, including many unarmed children. FARDC took some bodies

away in two trucks, while others were buried by residents and the Red Cross of the

Democratic Republic of the Congo.

14 GE.18-10936

81. All along the Mutena-Kamako road and the border with Angola, similar abuses were

committed by the Kamuina Nsapu militia and FARDC, including in the villages of Diboko,

Lubami-Monga, Tshiniota, Sumbula, Mutshima, Lupemba, Mudjadja, Lumpedi, Kungu,

Kilolo, Bakua Mukuna and Bwalu Kai. In addition, the Kamuina Nsapu militia’s rape of

women, including gang rape, and of a man, was documented in these villages or when the

inhabitants of this part of Kamonia territory fled. In May, for example, men and boys from

the village of Mudjadja were abducted from their homes by members of the Kamuina

Nsapu militia and taken to the tshiota in Diboko, supposedly to be baptized. It became the

scene of the beheading of at least 186 men and boys. Their bodies were buried in two mass

graves by the Red Cross of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

82. Incursions by members of the Kamuina Nsapu militia in the town of Kamonia began

around 10 April, when at least 35 militia members, mostly children, were killed by the

defence and security forces and members of the Bana Mura militia. During these

incursions, the Kamuina Nsapu militia killed residents, raped women, looted homes and

beheaded people associated with State authority. The Bana Mura militia members, for their

part, followed orders from at least two civilian chiefs and a Congolese National Police

colonel and acted in concert with members of the defence and security forces. At the same

time, members of the Bana Mura militias committed abuses against the Luba-speaking and

Bindi population, whom they suspected of supporting the Kamuina Nsapu militia. Several

dozen people were killed during these crackdowns and their bodies were buried in about a

dozen mass graves. Some houses were looted and others were burned down, sometimes

with their inhabitants still inside. In the neighbouring village of Tshimunde, dozens of

people were killed by Bana Mura militiamen. In April and May, FARDC also carried out

summary executions, abducted girls and committed rape.

83. In the wake of the targeted attacks and killings perpetrated by the Bana Mura

militiamen, the Luba-speaking population of the town of Kamonia fled en masse to the

town of Tshikapa. On the road linking the two cities, Bana Mura militiamen raped,

summarily executed and mistreated those fleeing. FARDC also extorted and beat civilians

and raped women and girls fleeing the violence. A woman who was seven months pregnant

was raped by a member of FARDC and then by a member of the Bana Mura militia.

Barriers were set up along the road, either by the Bana Mura militiamen or by the defence

and security forces, or jointly, and many abuses were committed against Luba-speakers.

Witnesses described passing through villages that had been deserted or burned to the

ground and seeing many corpses, including those of women and children.

84. In March, the Kamuina Nsapu militia arrived in the Lovua-Luthsima area and

beheaded many people, including in the villages of Senge (or Cinq) and Mvula-Milenge. In

response, the Bana Mura militias intensified their activities. Between 24 and 26 April, large

numbers of Luba-speaking men, women and children were injured or killed in attacks

planned by the Bana Mura militiamen in the villages of Senge, Camp Kwilu, Kakondo and

Mvula-Milenge. The Bana Mura militias were composed of Chokwe people, armed with

rifles and machetes, some of which had been provided by the chief of Muyeji village. The

Bana Mura militiamen were clearly targeting Luba-speaking residents.

85. A barrier had been set up by the Bana Mura militiamen along the banks of the

Tshikapa River at Kakondo, to prevent Luba-speakers from escaping. Those who spoke

Chokwe were allowed to pass. Many Luba-speaking residents, including children, were

executed there, at the river crossing. Others were mistreated or killed as they fled. Women

and girls were raped. In some cases, FARDC supported and guided the Bana Mura

militiamen during the attacks. In others, they escorted displaced groups. FARDC, however,

did not intervene to prevent the numerous abuses committed by the Bana Mura militiamen

against Luba-speakers.

86. At the Tshikapa River crossing, Bana Mura militiamen separated Luba-speaking

men and women not of childbearing age, beheaded them and threw their bodies into the

river. The other women and girls were taken to farms owned by individuals belonging to

the Chokwe ethnic group, including in Sha-Findji, Tshikala and Kisasa. The women and

girls sent to those farms were placed under constant surveillance and some had to work all

day. They were repeatedly raped during their captivity, sometimes several times a day,

often for months at a time. According to numerous victims, it was the perpetrators’

GE.18-10936 15

intention for them to give birth to Chokwe children, as ethnicity is passed on through the

male line. Luba-speaking children of all ages were also brought to the farms, where they

were mistreated and malnourished. In some cases, the names of Luba-speaking children

were changed to Chokwe names. At the time of writing this report, women and children

were still being held on the farms.

(e) Northern part of Kamonia territory

87. In villages located in the north of Tshikapa, persons belonging to the Pende ethnic

group calling themselves Écurie Mbe attacked Luba-speakers and injured and killed

civilians, abducted children who were later reportedly enslaved and looted and burned

down homes.

VIII. Consequences of the Kasaï crisis and the current situation

88. Since August 2017, the level of violence has decreased in all the provinces of Kasaï.

However, crisis-related violence is still being reported, indicating that the causes of the

conflict have not yet been addressed. FARDC has continued to use excessive force in

operations against the Kamuina Nsapu militia. Persons wrongfully suspected of belonging

to the militia continue to be detained, beaten or killed. Villages suspected of harbouring

militia members have been looted or burned down. For example, on 30 November, in

Kamonia territory, Kasaï Province, a FARDC force raided the village of Kabeya-Lumbu,

which they associated with the Kamuina Nsapu militia. The soldiers opened fire on the

population near the market after food had been distributed by a humanitarian organization,

killing and wounding numerous people. In general, the strong military presence in Kasaï

has led to the harassment of the population; numerous cases of extortion have been

reported, particularly at FARDC-controlled roadblocks.

89. The Kamuina Nsapu militia has remained active, especially in Kasaï Central, and

continues to recruit members, including children, and to carry out attacks, albeit on a lesser

scale. For example, on the night of 30 April 2018, militia members attacked and killed the

acting customary chief of Kamuina Nsapu village, who was close to provincial authorities,

along with three members of his family.

90. In the southern part of the territory of Kamonia, strained relations between members

of the Chokwe and Luba ethnic groups have also led to attacks on villages by the Bana

Mura militias and clashes between the Bana Mura militiamen and persons belonging to the

Luba ethnic group over access to mining sites. Luba women, sometimes with their children,

continue to be enslaved by Bana Mura militiamen. Despite advocacy efforts by some

international organizations, the response of defence and security forces to these crimes

remains insufficient. What is more, the presence of the Bana Mura militias prevents Luba

internally displaced persons from returning to their villages of origin.

91. The violence in Kasaï has caused an acute and unprecedented humanitarian crisis,

with the displacement of an estimated 1.4 million people, including 35,000 refugees in

Angola. According to figures from the World Food Programme and the Food and

Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, some 3.2 million people continue to be

affected by severe food insecurity, and malnutrition rates are high, especially among

children.

92. The team of international experts has been shocked by the humanitarian situation, in

particular the precariousness of the groups displaced by the violence. Many of the people

interviewed had spent weeks or even months living in extremely difficult conditions before

reaching cities such as Tshikapa or Kikwit. They had fled the violence without any help or

with minimal assistance or relief. Some displaced people, including children, have died of

malnutrition or disease. The proliferation of barriers controlled by armed factions has

impeded access to fields, which, in turn, has affected the local economy. Lastly, the

collection of illegal taxes has raised the price of basic goods.

93. Children have been particularly affected by the violence in Kasaï; they have been

both the main victims and the main perpetrators of the violence. According to figures from

16 GE.18-10936

the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), as at 30 August 2017, 1,220 boys and 658

girls had been recruited and used by the Kamuina Nsapu militia. However, the team

believes the numbers are in fact much higher and the recruitment is ongoing. Many children

have been abducted, wounded, mutilated, detained or executed. Some have seen their

parents beheaded or beaten, or their mothers raped. Many of them have been forced to fight

on the front line without weapons or with dummy weapons, knives or, occasionally,

traditional rifles. They have been forced to kill and decapitate bodies. The physical and

psychological trauma and stigmatization suffered by these children will require long-term

care. This massive use of children belonging to the same ethnic group has multiple

consequences for their community and creates a climate of suspicion towards them, which

can generate extreme reactions.

94. UNICEF estimates that, since the beginning of the crisis in Kasaï, 416 schools and

224 health centres have been looted or destroyed. Schools and other educational

establishments were prime targets of the Kamuina Nsapu militia.

95. A significant number of victims of sexual violence, mainly rape, have described the

difficulties that they have faced. In addition to the medical and psychological problems they

suffer, survivors are also ostracized by their families and communities owing to the weight

given to tradition and the resulting economic and social challenges. Many women have

been raped in front of their husbands, children or other family members. It is therefore the

entire social fabric of Kasaï that is suffering the consequences of this sexual violence. Most

rape victims are reluctant to report their ordeal for fear of stigmatization and owing to a

general feeling of mistrust towards the justice system and a lack of effective reparation.

IX. Legal characterization

96. The acts of violence committed against civilians are violations of human rights and

international humanitarian law that constitute international crimes.

A. Crimes against humanity

97. Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court defines crimes

against humanity as acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed

against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack. “Attack directed against any

civilian population” means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts

referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a

State or organizational policy to commit such attack. The adjective “widespread” connotes

the large-scale nature of the attack and the existence of a certain number of victims,

whereas the adjective “systematic” refers to the organized nature of the acts of violence and

improbability of their random occurrence. The presence of combatants among the civilian

population does not deprive this population of its civilian status.

98. The attacks perpetrated by the defence and security forces, the Kamuina Nsapu

militia and the Bana Mura militias as described in the preceding sections were carried out

against civilian populations in a widespread and systematic manner, pursuant to a State or

organizational policy to commit such an attack. These attacks thus constitute crimes against

humanity, including murder, rape or any other form of sexual violence of comparable

gravity, enslavement, including for sexual slavery, persecution and other inhuman acts.

B. War crimes

99. Under article 8 (2) (c) and (e) of the Rome Statute, war crimes are defined, in the

case of an armed conflict not of an international character, as serious violations of article 3

common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 against persons taking no active part in

the hostilities, and other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed

conflicts.

GE.18-10936 17

100. The team of international experts has reasonable grounds to believe that, as from

August 2016 and during the period covered by this report, there was an armed conflict not

of an international character in Kasaï between FARDC and the Kamuina Nsapu militia. In

order to establish the existence of such a conflict, two criteria must be met: a minimum

level of organization of the parties to the conflict and a certain intensity of violence.

101. The facts presented in this report lead to the conclusion that the Kamuina Nsapu

militia is an armed group with a sufficient level of organization to conduct a protracted

armed conflict, as demonstrated for example by the existence of chains of command, a

concrete strategy, the ability to recruit and train combatants, the existence and enforcement

of disciplinary sanctions to ensure compliance with orders and the ability to plan and

launch coordinated and large-scale military operations.

102. The facts also show that the intensity of the violence, including the number,

duration, frequency and severity of the armed confrontations and their spread through four

provinces over a prolonged period, far exceeded that associated with mere situations of

internal unrest or tension. The number of victims and displaced persons fleeing the fighting,

the scale and extent of the destruction across four provinces, the type and numbers of the

government forces involved and the establishment of a military operations sector to deal

with the situation also support this conclusion.

103. Many of the acts described above were committed by FARDC and the Kamuina

Nsapu militia against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, or in violation of the

laws and customs applicable to armed conflict, in cases of armed conflict not of an

international character. They thus constituted war crimes. These crimes include murder,

mutilation, rape or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity, looting,

intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against civilians

taking no active part in hostilities, intentionally directing attacks against religious buildings,

schools and hospitals that are not military objectives, and conscripting or enlisting children

under the age of 15 into armed groups and forcing them to play an active part in hostilities.

C. Human rights violations

104. The facts presented in this report lead to the conclusion that the following human

rights in particular have been violated: the right to life, the right to physical and mental

integrity, the right to liberty and security of person and the right to freedom of movement.

The cases of enslavement and the recruitment and use of child soldiers that have been

observed also constitute human rights violations. These violations have had a direct impact

on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by the people of Kasaï.

X. Conclusions and recommendations

A. Conclusions

105. The team of international experts is appalled by the dire human rights situation

prevailing in the Kasaï region since 2016. It is particularly concerned about the

widespread nature of the violence that its investigations have revealed. This report

relates only to a small number of the acts and crimes committed. Although the team is

not able to give an exact number of victims, it estimates that several thousand people

have lost their lives during the crisis. The team is also concerned about the low level of

attention that this tragedy has been given.

106. The team confirms that the defence and security forces, the Kamuina Nsapu

militia and the Bana Mura militias have deliberately killed civilians, including many

children. They have committed numerous atrocities, including mutilation, rape and

other forms of sexual violence, and destroyed entire villages. The team believes some

of the abuses committed by the defence and security forces, the Kamuina Nsapu

militia and the Bana Mura militia constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes,

as well as violations and abuses of human rights.

18 GE.18-10936

107. The violence in Kasaï has awakened latent ethnic tensions and, since the

beginning of 2017, the conflict has taken on an ethnic dimension, particularly in

Kamonia territory. The team is of the view that the abuses committed by the Bana

Mura militia against members of the Luba ethnic group may be characterized as

persecution on political and ethnic grounds constituting crimes against humanity.

108. The team considers that there is an urgent need for a militia disarmament

policy and a reconciliation process so as to forestall a new wave of violence and to

enable the return of internally displaced persons and refugees.

109. Impunity remains a very serious problem, given the scale and gravity of the

crimes in question. While a few judicial proceedings have been initiated and some

decisions handed down, the efforts made to date are clearly insufficient to provide a

satisfactory response to the victims in view of the nature of the crimes. Rigorous and

extensive work remains to be done by the judicial authorities to ensure that the

perpetrators of the crimes linked to the wave of violence are brought to justice and

that the rights of the very numerous victims are effectively restored. While it is

primarily the responsibility of the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the

Congo to try the perpetrators of international crimes, the team recalls that the

Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, which is already investigating the

situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, has expressed concern about the

acts of violence committed in Kasaï and has indicated that she will continue to

monitor the situation closely.

B. Recommendations

110. The international team of experts recognizes the urgent need to begin

combating impunity forthwith by punishing the most serious crimes committed by all

those involved in the crisis. However, in order to prevent the violence from recurring,

bring justice to the victims and foster reconciliation, punishment for the most serious

crimes will not, alone, be sufficient.

111. The team recommends that the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the

Congo take the following steps:

(a) Engage in an inclusive process of transitional justice aimed at

establishing the truth, identifying the root causes of the crisis and providing redress to

victims, in order to ensure reconciliation;

(b) Honour their international commitments and enforce existing laws;

(c) Strengthen the capacity of Kasaï military prosecutors’ offices to

investigate, prosecute and try perpetrators, including the highest-ranking officials, for

the many international crimes committed in Kasaï since 2016, by:

(i) Increasing the human and logistical resources of military prosecutors’

offices;

(ii) Ensuring that the officers in charge of the prosecutors’ offices have at

least the same rank as the operational officers who may be held criminally

liable;

(iii) Applying a prosecution strategy so as to ensure that the perpetrators of

crimes from all the parties involved in the violence are brought to justice;

(d) Ensure that specialized personnel are assigned the specific task of

investigating and prosecuting crimes of sexual violence;

(e) Enforce the application of judicial protection measures for victims of

crimes of sexual violence and, by providing legal assistance, encourage them to lodge

complaints and to testify before the courts;

GE.18-10936 19

(f) Ensure that persons convicted of crimes of sexual violence are given

appropriate sentences and are prohibited from joining or remaining in the defence

and security forces;

(g) Ensure that, in cases where minors are to be tried, investigators are

given specialized training and that accused children are tried in specialized juvenile

chambers with appropriate procedures in place;

(h) Enforce the application of judicial protection measures for child victims

in order to facilitate their participation and to protect their identity;

(i) Take concrete and effective steps to ensure, by incorporating a gender

perspective, that victims of sexual violence and child victims have access to

appropriate medical, psychosocial and socioeconomic services;

(j) Work to secure the immediate release of the women and children who

are still held captive by the Bana Mura militiamen in Kamonia territory.

112. The team recommends that MONUSCO provide practical support to the

competent judicial authorities in the prosecution of perpetrators of international

crimes in Kasaï, including by facilitating the holding of mobile court hearings.

113. The team recommends that the Secretary-General of the United Nations closely

monitor the progress of the investigations by the Democratic Republic of the Congo

into the deaths of the two United Nations experts and their companions and, if

necessary, broaden the mandate and increase the resources of the United Nations

country team responsible for supporting the national investigation to ensure that

those responsible are brought to justice.

20 GE.18-10936

Annex

Map of Kasaï

Map provided courtesy of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.