40/24 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran - Report of the Secretary-General
Document Type: Final Report
Date: 2019 Feb
Session: 40th Regular Session (2019 Feb)
Agenda Item: Item2: Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General
GE.19-01989(E)
Human Rights Council Fortieth session
25 February–22 March 2019 Agenda item 2
Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the
High Commissioner and the Secretary-General
Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Report of the Secretary-General*
Summary
The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 73/181, in
which the Secretary-General was requested to submit an interim report on the situation of
human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Human Rights Council at its fortieth
session. The report reflects the patterns and trends in that regard, and provides information
on the progress made in the implementation of resolution 73/181 and recommendations to
improve its implementation.
* Agreement was reached to publish the present report after the standard publication date owing to circumstances beyond the submitter’s control.
United Nations A/HRC/40/24
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 73/181, in
which the Secretary-General was requested to submit an interim report on the situation of
human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Human Rights Council at its fortieth
session. The report provides information on progress made in the implementation of the
resolution. It draws on observations made by the United Nations human rights treaty bodies,
the special procedures of the Human Rights Council and various United Nations entities. It
also reflects information from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, State media
and non-governmental organizations and from individual interviews with known victims
and alleged victims and their families and with lawyers. The Secretary-General
acknowledges the detailed submission provided by the Government in response to the draft
of the present report.
2. The Secretary-General notes that the Government has increasingly engaged with the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and with
United Nations human rights mechanisms. Representatives of OHCHR visited Tehran in
May 2018 and met with a range of interlocutors to discuss the human rights situation in the
country. The Government has extended an invitation to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights and to three special procedure mandate holders.
II. Overview of the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran
A. Death penalty and right to a fair trial
Use of the death penalty and the amendment to the drug trafficking law
3. According to article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
States parties that have not yet abolished the death penalty should only impose it for the
“most serious crimes”, which has been interpreted as meaning those involving intentional
killing.1 The Secretary-General remains concerned by the continued application of the death
penalty for a wide range of offences, including those which are vague or uncertain in scope,
such as efsad-e fel-arz (“spreading corruption on earth”),2 and those which do not involve
intentional killing and therefore do not amount to “most serious crimes”, such as adultery3
or consensual sexual relations between two men in certain circumstances.4
4. Information received by OHCHR indicates that 207 persons were executed in the
Islamic Republic of Iran between January and October 2018,5 compared to 437 recorded
during the same period in 2017. This decline may have resulted from the amendment to the
drug trafficking law which entered into force in November 2017 and which replaced the
mandatory death penalty with a prison term of up to 30 years (retroactively and
prospectively) for non-violent drug-related offences. While mandatory death sentences for
numerous drug-related offences were retained, the amendment increased the quantity of
drugs required for a death sentence to be imposed. The amended law still criminalizes
addiction and transforms some crimes into capital crimes for first-time offenders in specific
circumstances.6 United Nations human rights mechanisms have consistently underscored
1 See Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 36 (2018) on the right to life.
2 See the report of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, available from www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session37/Pages/
ListReports.aspx; and A/73/398, para. 23.
3 Penal Code, arts. 136 and 225.
4 Ibid., art. 235.
5 See https://iranhr.net/en/articles/3514/.
6 Drug trafficking law, arts. 8 and 45.
that drug-related offences do not meet the threshold of “most serious crimes” and the death
penalty should not be applied to them.7
5. In previous reports, the Secretary-General welcomed the amendment to the drug
trafficking law,8 and notes that from January to November 2018, 8 executions for drug-
related offences were reported, compared with 221 for the same period in 2017. In October
2018, the Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Judiciary Commission stated that the
death sentences of 15,000 individuals had been commuted.9 However it remains difficult to
verify this information, and concerns also persist with the review of cases as regards the
availability of legal assistance to those eligible for review and the lack of opportunity to
appeal the outcome.10
Execution of child offenders
6. The Secretary-General continues to be alarmed by the sentencing of children to
death in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and regrets that the execution of child offenders
continues despite repeated calls by United Nations human rights bodies and mechanisms
for the abolition of this practice. The Islamic Republic of Iran is a party to both the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, which both prohibit the execution of juvenile offenders without exception. The
Penal Code retains the death penalty for boys of at least 15 lunar years and girls of at least 9
lunar years for qisas (retribution in kind) or hudud crimes, such as homicide and adultery,
in contravention of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. According to information received by OHCHR, at
least 85 individuals, who were under 18 years old at the time of the offence allegedly
committed, were on death row as at 1 December 2018. The Secretary-General reiterates his
numerous calls for the Government, in line with its international legal obligations, to
immediately commute the death sentences of all persons convicted of crimes allegedly
committed when they were under 18 years of age.11 OHCHR and the Secretary-General
stand ready to support the Government in any efforts it may undertake in this regard.
7. OHCHR has observed a pattern of the authorities delaying the implementation of
death sentences on children until they reach the age of 18. In some cases, the executions of
a number of child offenders have been repeatedly postponed and rescheduled. The reported
lack of information on the timing of executions imposes continuous anticipation of
imminent death, resulting in acute mental distress for child offenders and their families.12
8. In 2018, at least six child offenders – Mahboubeh Mofidi, Amir Pourjafar, Ali
Kazemi, Abolfazi Sharahi, Zeinab Sekaanvand Lokran and Omid Rostami – were aged
between 14 and 17 at the time of their alleged commission of a crime. In October 2018, the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a statement13 highlighting
serious due process concerns about the conviction of Ms. Lokran for the murder of her
husband. These six alleged child offenders were executed for murder under qisas. In such
cases, the next of kin of the victim has the right to forgive the defendant, accept a payment
(diya) as compensation, or request the death penalty. The Government stated that it
generally sought, through the Reconciliation Commission and the provision of cash
assistance, to “encourage reconciliation by helping the convict to pay diya”. 14 The
Secretary-General stresses that pardon or commutation procedures must offer certain
essential guarantees, notes that the payment of diya might discriminate against those who
7 CCPR/C/PAK/CO/1, para. 17; CCPR/C/THA/CO/2, para. 17; CCPR/C/KWT/CO/3, para. 22;
A/71/372, para. 48; and Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 36.
8 See the report of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, available from www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session37/Pages/
ListReports.aspx; and A/73/299, para. 17.
9 See http://kerman.farsnews.com/news/13970725000810.
10 See https://iranhr.net/en/articles/3325/.
11 See A/73/299.
12 CCPR/C/77/D/886/1999, para. 10.2; and CCPR/C/77/D/887/1999, para. 9.2.
13 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23689&LangID=E.
14 See https://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session20/IR/Iran2ndCycle.pdf, p. 110.
may not have the financial means,15 and again urges the State to permanently end the
sentencing of child offenders to death.
Economic and financial crimes
9. On 11 August 2018, the Head of the Judiciary proposed the establishment of special
courts to “take swift and decisive action” against individuals referred to as “economic
disruptors” in the context of an “economic war”, by way of a directive.16 The Secretary-
General is concerned that the directive excludes the right to have a conviction and sentence
reviewed by a higher tribunal for all those convicted of economic corruption and sentenced
to punishments other than the death penalty, in contravention of article 14 (5) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The directive also reduces the time
allowed for filing an appeal in economic corruption cases from 20 to 5 days. It prohibits
reductions or suspensions of punishment irrespective of mitigating circumstances and
extends the aforementioned restrictions on legal counsel of one’s choosing to cases of
economic corruption.
10. According to the judiciary, dozens of individuals have been convicted of economic
corruption offences and been sentenced to prison terms ranging from 3 to 20 years 17
without the possibility of appeal. According to information received by OHCHR, five
individuals have been sentenced to death under the above-mentioned directive, two of
whom have been executed.18 Three individuals were reportedly also sentenced to death for
“corruption on earth for disrupting the country’s economy”.19 The verdicts are subject to an
appeal before the Supreme Court. Forty-seven flogging sentences for economic crimes
were issued in 2018, compared to four in 2017. 20 Flogging, as well as stoning and
amputation, remain prescribed as punishments for hudud offences under the Penal Code
although the Human Rights Committee deems them incompatible with article 7 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Right to a fair trial
11. OHCHR continues to receive reports indicating that death sentences are passed
following proceedings that do not respect the guarantees of fair trial. Concerns in this
respect have been documented more particularly in cases relating to child offenders, dual
and foreign nationals, human rights defenders, journalists, those accused of economic
crimes, and minorities.21
12. The Secretary-General is also concerned by restrictions on access to legal assistance
of the defendant’s choosing during the pretrial phase, in contravention of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and article 35 of the Constitution. Article 48 of the
Penal Code requires that individuals accused of crimes against external or internal security
select their legal representation from a list approved by the Head of the Judiciary during the
investigative phase – which is the period when confessions are often obtained. Such
restrictions are all the more concerning in view of consistent reports that torture and other
ill-treatment to compel confessions is most frequent during the initial investigative stage.
This pattern has been reported particularly in the cases of foreign and dual nationals,
minority groups, human rights defenders and child offenders, as outlined in the present
report. In this respect, the State has stated that confessions extracted under duress or torture
are prohibited by the Constitution22 and deemed inadmissible before the courts.23 However,
15 A/61/311, para. 60.
16 See www.isna.ir/news/97052010719/.
17 See www.iribnews.ir/fa/news/2240981/.
18 See www.mehrnews.com/news/4437149/.
19 See khabaronline.ir/news/822834.
20 See www.irna.ir/fa/News/83050447, www.irna.ir/fa/News/83065377 and
www.mizanonline.com/fa/news/454277/.
21 See the report of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of
Iran available from www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session37/Pages/
ListReports.aspx; and A/73/299.
22 Constitution, art. 38.
the Penal Code establishes that a confession alone can be used to base a conviction on,
irrespective of other evidence available.24
Arbitrary arrests and detention of dual and foreign nationals
13. The Secretary-General remains concerned about the situation of imprisoned dual and
foreign nationals, including Ahmadreza Djalali, Siamak and Baquer Namazi, Nazanin
Zaghari-Ratcliffe, Kamran Ghaderi, Saeed Malekpour, Xiyue Wang, Nizar Zakka and
Robert Levinson. In its comments, the Government denied that Mr. Levinson was detained
and stated it had initiated an investigation in line with the legal obligations of the Islamic
Republic of Iran. The Government also noted that the other aforementioned individuals
were being held on charges related to national security. In recent opinions of the Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention, a pattern has been noted of targeting dual25 and foreign26
nationals for detention, as well as a related pattern of violations of due process. 27 The
Working Group found that several of the aforementioned individuals, including Ahmadreza
Djalali who has been sentenced to death, had been arbitrarily detained, and it called for
their immediate release.28
Situation of members of ethnic and religious minorities
14. Discrimination on the basis of religion is codified in law. Unrecognized religious
minorities do not have the right to equal qisas or diya29 and the testimony of a non-Muslim
against a Muslim is not admissible in court.30 Members of minorities reportedly constitute
the majority of political prisoners and a disproportionate percentage of persons executed on
political and national security-related charges.31
15. In September 2018, three Kurdish prisoners, Zanyar and Loghman Moradi and
Ramin Hossein Panahi, were executed despite serious concerns that they had not received
fair trials and had reportedly been tortured in detention.32 Concerns have also been raised
about the situation of Hedayat Abdollapour, whose death sentence was upheld by the
Supreme Court in October 2018 amidst reports that he had been subjected to torture in
detention and had been denied access to his legal counsel of choice. In its comments, the
Government stated that these individuals had been sentenced to death in relation to acts
against national security.
16. Concerns have also been raised about the fate and whereabouts of eight Gonabadi
dervishes who allegedly held a sit-in protest in August 2018 at Great Tehran Penitentiary
and were subsequently detained.33
17. In early July 2018, 80 persons from the Azerbaijani Turkish community were
reportedly detained or summoned by security forces in the context of an annual celebration
in East Azerbaijan Province. 34 Most have been released, amidst reports that they were
subjected to ill-treatment. In August, 40 persons from the community were arrested in
connection with another gathering in the city of Meshgin Shahr in Ardabil Province, amidst
reports of the use of excessive force by security forces. They were subsequently released.35
23 Penal Code, arts. 168–169.
24 Ibid., art. 171; and Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 194.
25 Opinion No. 49/2017, para. 44.
26 Opinion No. 52/2018, para. 82.
27 Ibid., para. 86.
28 See opinions No. 52/2018, No. 92/2017, No. 49/2017, No. 7/2017, No. 50/2016 and No. 28/2016.
29 Penal Code.
30 Ibid., arts. 176 and 177 (c).
31 See https://ipa.united4iran.org/en/prisoner/ and A/HRC/37/68.
32 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23512&LangID=E.
33 See https://iranhumanrights.org/2018/10/great-tehran-penitentiary-imposes-information-blackout-on-
eight-sufi-detainees-held-in-solitary-confinement/.
34 See www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1388892018ENGLISH.PDF.
35 Ibid.
18. Gunmen attacked a military parade in Ahvaz on 22 September 2018. At least 24
persons were reportedly killed, including children, and more than 60 persons were injured.36
The Secretary-General condemned the attack and expressed his condolences.37 According
to information received by OHCHR, at least 180 individuals from Ahwazi Arab minority
groups have been detained incommunicado since 24 September in connection with the
attack.38 The Ministry of Intelligence announced that only 22 people had been arrested.39
The authorities later denied allegations concerning their execution.40 The Secretary-General
calls for transparency on the number of persons arrested, their fate and whereabouts, and
the charges they may be facing.
B. Impact of the economic and financial challenges on the realization of
human rights
Economic and financial challenges
19. Large-scale protests across the Islamic Republic of Iran starting in late December
2017 and continuing into early January 2018 were prompted by falling living standards,
water scarcity, unemployment and high inflation. Despite the Government’s declared
intention to address the population’s grievances, notably through direct support packages,41
social unrest has continued.
20. Due to internal and external factors, including in anticipation of the reimposition of
sanctions by the United States of America, the Islamic Republic of Iran has seen growing
difficulties in its economy. The value of the Iranian national currency, before it stabilized
recently, reportedly fell by up to 60 per cent in 2018, significantly increasing import costs.
In this context, the affordability of medical care has deteriorated. According to some
medical academics, patients with Parkinson’s disease are experiencing difficulties in
accessing treatment due to its high cost.42 Reports describe a twofold increase in the price
of hearing aids since 2018.43
21. In December 2018, the Iranian Central Bank reported 44 a significant increase in
prices of food commodities compared to December 2017, ranging from 15 per cent for
beans to 62 per cent for fresh fruits. High food-price volatility has had a negative impact on
food security and particularly affects the most vulnerable groups, including low-income
populations.45
22. The Secretary-General is encouraged by the Government’s efforts to comply with
the requirements of the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force, including through
legislation aimed at making the laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran consistent with
international standards. He welcomes the fact that two of the four proposed bills related to
Financial Action Task Force requirements have become law. In its comments on the present
report, the Government noted that the fight against money-laundering was enshrined in
article 49 of the Constitution.
23. On 8 May 2018, the President of the United States of America signed National
Security Presidential Memorandum 11, ceasing the participation of the United States in the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action46 and paving the way for full reimposition of sanctions
36 See www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13523.doc.htm.
37 See www.un.org/press/en/2018/sgsm19229.doc.htm.
38 See www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/11/iran-fears-mounting-for-detained-ahwazi-arabs-amid-
reports-of-secret-executions/.
39 See www.isna.ir/news/97070201416/.
40 See www.isna.ir/news/97082110201.
41 See http://tn.ai/1860143 and www.mizanonline.com/fa/news/464883/.
42 See www.irna.ir/fa/News/83048032.
43 See www.yjc.ir/00S1aK.
44 See www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1397/09/10/1888233/.
45 See www.fao.org/3/a-i2417e.pdf.
46 See www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/ceasing-u-s-participation-jcpoa-taking-additional-
action-counter-irans-malign-influence-deny-iran-paths-nuclear-weapon/.
on the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Secretary-General affirmed that issues not directly
related to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action should be addressed without prejudice to
preserving the agreement and its accomplishments.47
Humanitarian exemptions under sanctions
24. On 16 July 2018, the Islamic Republic of Iran instituted proceedings against the
United States before the International Court of Justice invoking an alleged violation of the
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights concluded between the two
States in 1955.48 On 3 October 2018, the Court indicated provisional measures pending
further proceedings in the case and its final decision.49 The Court ordered the United States
to remove any impediments arising from the measures announced on 8 May 2018 that may
entail irreparable consequences for human life and health, specifically, impediments to the
exportation to the Islamic Republic of Iran of: (a) medicines and medical devices; (b)
foodstuffs and agricultural commodities; and (c) spare parts, equipment and associated
services necessary for the safety of civil aviation.50 The Court also instructed both States to
refrain from any further actions that might aggravate their dispute before the Court. The
United States subsequently announced that it was terminating the 1955 Treaty of Amity.51
Following the normal course of proceedings, the Court fixed the time limits for the filing of
written observations by the two States. 52 The subsequent procedure has been reserved for
further decision of the Court.
25. On 3 October 2018, the United States Secretary of State announced that “existing
exceptions, authorizations, and licensing policies for humanitarian-related transactions and
safety of flight will remain in effect”.53 The Department of the Treasury issued guidance on
humanitarian assistance and related exports to the Iranian people, 54 including for third-
country financial institutions. It is stated in the guidance that sanctions will be imposed on
transactions with any Iranian individual or entity on the Department of the Treasury’s list of
Specially Designated Nationals. In practice, however, humanitarian-related transactions
prove difficult. According to reports,55 companies exporting medical supplies to the Islamic
Republic of Iran face the dual challenge of accessing non-sanctioned banking services and
shortages of foreign currency in the Islamic Republic of Iran, which limit the possibility of
payments to foreign companies.
26. In his statement published on 22 August 2018, the Special Rapporteur on the
negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights noted, in
relation to the Islamic Republic of Iran, that “the current system creates doubt and
ambiguity which makes it all but impossible for Iran to import these urgently needed
humanitarian goods. This ambiguity causes a ‘chilling effect’ which is likely to lead to
silent deaths in hospitals as medicines run out, while the international media fail to
notice.”56
27. Following a declaration by United States officials57 that the Society for Worldwide
Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) could be subject to sanctions, SWIFT
indicated its decision to suspend a number of Iranian banks. 58 Non-sanctioned Iranian
47 See www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2018-05-08/statement-secretary-general-joint-
comprehensive-plan-action-jcpoa.
48 See www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/175/175-20181003-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf.
49 See www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/175/175-20181003-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf and www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/175/175-20181003-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf.
50 Ibid.
51 See www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/10/286417.htm.
52 See www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/175/175-20181016-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf and www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/175/175-20181010-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf.
53 See www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/10/286417.htm.
54 See www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/hum_exp_iran.pdf.
55 See www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_iran_the_case_for_protecting_humanitarian_trade.
56 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23469&LangID=E.
57 See www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/11/287090.htm.
58 See www.swift.com/about-us/legal/compliance/swift-and-sanctions#Statements.
financial institutions were allowed to remain on SWIFT to conduct limited transactions
involving food and medicine.59 On 18 May, the European Commission launched the formal
process to activate the blocking statute 60 prohibiting European Union citizens from
complying with the extraterritorial sanctions of the United States and allowing European
companies to recover damages associated with these sanctions.61 The European Union has
also stated it will develop a special purpose vehicle to facilitate exports of mainly essential
items to the Islamic Republic of Iran by enabling financial transactions.62
C. Right to an adequate standard of living and right to health
28. According to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
to which the Islamic Republic of Iran is a party, the right to health includes a right to access
timely and appropriate health care and underlying determinants of health such as safe and
potable water, nutritious food, housing and a healthy environment. 63 As noted in its
comments, the Government has consistently included agriculture and food security, water,
environment and health in its successive national plans and programmes of economic,
social and cultural development. Notwithstanding resource limitations, in particular in the
context of economic challenges, it is the Government’s responsibility to ensure the
satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of the rights of Iranians to access
to an adequate standard of living, health and water.64
Right to water and adequate sanitation
29. Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
obliges States parties to ensure sustainable access to clean water for domestic, personal and
agricultural uses.65 Many observers have expressed concern about issues related to access to
water. A recent World Bank report assessed that 94 per cent of the population was exposed
to water stress due to inefficiencies and overuse. 66 The World Resources Institute has
ranked the Islamic Republic of Iran as one of 33 countries at extremely high risk of water
stress by 2040.67 The current head of the Department of Environment has warned of the
severity of the water crisis in the Islamic Republic of Iran.68
30. Water stress is also producing environmental degradation. It is leading to drought,
resulting in desertification.69 For example, since 1970 Lake Urmia has shrunk by nearly 90
per cent.70 The water crisis is having an impact on the economy. Parts of Kermanshah
Province, which once produced substantial amounts of pistachios and dates, can no longer
produce these crops.71 These economic and environmental problems are contributing to
internal displacement, with many farmers or inhabitants of smaller towns migrating to the
59 See www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-02/trump-s-iran-bank-cutoff-from-swift-will-
make-u-s-sanctions-hurt.
60 See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996R2271:EN:HTML.
61 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3861_en.htm.
62 See https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/03/how-europe-can-blunt-u-s-iran-sanctions-without-
washington-raising-a-finger-humanitarian-spv/.
63 See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 14 (2000) on the right
to the highest attainable standard of health, para. 12.
64 See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comments No. 3 (1990) on the
nature of States parties’ obligations, para. 10; No. 12 (1999) on the right to adequate food, para. 17;
No. 14 (2000) on the right to the highest attainable standard of health, para. 43; and No. 15 (2002) on
the right to water, paras. 37 and 44.
65 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 12 (2); and Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 14, para. 4, and general comment No. 15.
66 See https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/27659.
67 See www.wri.org/blog/2015/08/ranking-world-s-most-water-stressed-countries-2040.
68 See www.tehrantimes.com/news/422583/Water-shortage-serious-says-environment-chief.
69 See http://amir.eng.uci.edu/publications/16_IR_Socio_Economic_Drought.pdf.
70 See www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/climate/water-iran.html.
71 See www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Environmental_and_Wildlife_
Degradation_in_Iran1.pdf.
outskirts of major urban centres because they are unable to make a living in their home
towns.72 In these areas, 35 per cent of the population live in impromptu settlements, with
limited access to public services and employment opportunities. 73 In its comments, the
Government stated its determination to take positive measures for an optimal and modern
use of water.
31. Protests around access to water have increased, with at least 12 demonstrations
reported in Khuzestan Province alone. On 29 May 2018, in the city of Bavi, farmers
gathered to protest against water scarcity.74 On 29 June, protests in Khorramshahr lasted for
three days. On the third day, protests spread to the cities of Abadan, Kut-e Abdollah and
Ahvaz. One Member of Parliament declared that the failure to benefit from the province’s
resources, and issues such as pollution and water scarcity, had fuelled the protests.75 The
Government stated in its comments that these protests had ended through mediation and
that the few individuals arrested had immediately been released.
32. Clashes between the authorities and protestors during some of the protests were
widely reported, with the authorities using tear gas to disperse the crowds.76 Officials stated
that 11 people had been injured in that context,77 and that 10 protestors had been detained
and 35 were under investigation.78 Also, 15 representatives were arrested when 200 farmers
presented themselves to the Governorate of Kohgiluyeh va Boyer Ahmad Province to
protest against water diversion.79 Isfahan farmers renewed their protests in October and
November 2018.80
Right to health
33. The Secretary-General is concerned by the increasing impact of the water crisis on
the right to health. 81 Untreated wastewater and sewage are increasingly contaminating
drinking and agricultural water supplies while less than 40 per cent of Iranians have access
to proper wastewater treatment facilities.82 The Islamic Republic of Iran is also among the
top five countries using untreated sewage for the irrigation of agricultural land, which can
generate contagious diseases, such as cholera.83
34. Inefficiencies in water management have also exacerbated health issues caused by
air pollution and sand and dust storms. In recent years, the World Health Organization has
listed many Iranian cities as some of the most polluted in the world, including Zabol (in
Sistan va Balushistan Province) and Ahvaz (in Khuzestan Province). 84 Many Ahvaz
residents suffer from various medical conditions due to air pollution. 85 Sand and dust
storms are particularly prevalent in Khuzestan, with environmentalists linking them to river
72 Ibid.
73 See www.iribnews.ir/fa/news/1581533/35.
74 See www.hra-news.org/2018/hranews/a-15528/.
75 See www.isna.ir/news/97041105927/.
76 See www.isna.ir/news/97041005412/ and https://iranhumanrights.org/2018/07/shots-fired-at-protest-
as-officials-unable-to-ease-water-shortage-crisis-in-irans-khuzestan-province/.
77 See www.isna.ir/news/97041005412/.
78 See www.mizanonline.com/fa/news/433203/.
79 See www.ilna.ir/fa/tiny/news-628251.
80 See www.isna.ir/news/97012408153/, www.irna.ir/fa/News/82882670 and
www.iranhumanrights.org/2018/11/isfahan-farmers-stage-40-day-protest-against-local-authorities-
mismanagement-of-scarce-water-supplies/.
81 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 12 (2); and Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 14, para. 4.
82 See www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Environmental_and_Wildlife_Degradation_in_
Iran1.pdf.
83 Ibid.
84 See www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15109116,
www.who.int/phe/health_topics/outdoorair/databases/cities-2011/en/ and
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/741891483046725613/pdf/111462-WP-P162048-
PUBLIC-IranEcoMonitor-12-22-2016.pdf.
85 See www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6108243/#R22.
diversion, dam construction and drying marshes for oil exploration. 86 The Secretary-
General recalls that Iranians have a right to adequate safe and accessible water, as well as to
an environment that ensures the highest standards of health. In its comments, the
Government noted its significant financial investment to reduce the effects of dust in
Khuzestan Province in recent years.
35. The adoption of secondary sanctions targeted at third parties affects trade originating
from other countries that are engaged in trade or investment in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Moreover, by preventing financial transfers to the Islamic Republic of Iran, secondary
sanctions are likely to hinder the production, availability and distribution of essential
medical and pharmaceutical equipment and supplies, which could potentially increase
mortality rates. In September 2018, 87 the Iranian Pharmaceutical Industries Syndicate
emphasized that while the country produced 96 per cent of its medicines, it imported more
than half of the raw materials required for their production. According to members of the
Parliament’s Health Commission, the Islamic Republic of Iran was short of 80
pharmaceutical items88 and hospitals were experiencing shortages of medicines, medical
equipment and consumer goods.89
Arrests and detention of environmentalists
36. The Secretary-General is concerned by reports of intimidation, arrest and detention
of environmentalists. Reports received indicate that since March 2018, 43
environmentalists have been arrested, only 8 of whom have been released. As of December
2018, the fate and whereabouts of the other detained environmentalists was unknown.90
37. In January, the head of the Persian Wildlife Heritage Foundation, Kavous Seyed
Emami, was arrested with eight members of the organization. They were accused of
gathering classified information under the guise of environmental projects. Mr. Seyed
Emami later died in custody and his wife is subjected to a travel ban. On 21 February,
several special procedure mandate holders publicly expressed concerns regarding his death
and the arrest of other environmental human rights defenders.91 The Government has not
yet provided information indicating whether an impartial and independent investigation has
been conducted into the circumstances of Mr. Seyed Emami’s death. In its comments, the
Government stated that the investigation and forensic examination had confirmed suicide as
the cause of death.
38. According to statements, including from Iranian officials, 92 the government
committee investigating the activities of the detained environmentalists concluded it could
not find any evidence of spying. On 24 October, however, the Prosecutor of Tehran
confirmed they had been indicted on the charge of “corruption on earth”, a crime
punishable by the death penalty. Reports received by OHCHR indicate that the defendants
have been denied access to a lawyer of their choosing, as well as regular contact with their
families, and have been deprived of access to medical care.
D. Rights to freedom of opinion and expression and to privacy
39. The Government has repeatedly stated the importance of information and
communications technology and of infrastructure development, in particular to enhance
access to information and bridge the technology gap in regard to rural areas. The Secretary-
General welcomes as a positive step the adoption of regulations relating to the
86 See www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2015/apr/16/iran-khuzestan-environment-wetlands-dust-
pollution.
87 See http://fna.ir/a0ws79.
88 See www.isna.ir/news/97061105121/.
89 See www.ilna.ir/fa/tiny/news-673055.
90 See www.iranhumanrights.org/2018/05/dozens-of-environmentalists-arrested-in-southern-iran-in-
widening-crackdown/.
91 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22697&LangID=E.
92 See www.isna.ir/news/97030100242/.
implementation of the Publication and Free Access to Information Act, of 2009,93 which
enables citizens to access information from State institutions within 10 days of their request,
including on the allocation of public funds.94 Yet, the legislation exempts organs under the
direct supervision of the Supreme Leader95 and excludes non-citizens.
40. The blocking of websites,96 including Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, remains an
issue of concern. On 30 April 2018, the judiciary ruled that Telegram would be banned for
“disrupting national unity” and “allowing foreign countries to spy” on the Islamic Republic
of Iran.97 With over 40 million registered users, Telegram served as a key communication
tool and supported social and community life as well as business transactions. According to
reports, the ban will primarily affect small and medium-sized companies, as well as lower-
income households unable to purchase online circumvention tools.98
41. In the course of 2018, the State continued to promote the use of local platforms such
as Telegram Talaeii and Hotgram, amidst concerns that these may interfere with online
privacy in ways that deter the exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression.
These platforms require the creation of user accounts that can only be accessed by holders
of SIM cards that are associated with a national identity document, as dictated by the policy
issued by the Communications Regulatory Authority in 2015.99 As a result, the personal
information of Internet users, including private addresses or photographs, was available on
platforms despite users not having directly registered on the platforms concerned.
42. Since the introduction of new regulations100 in August 2017 by the Supreme Council
of Cyberspace, the authorities have continuously increased their surveillance capabilities
through the centralization of Internet and related technology infrastructure. The National
Information Network, reportedly developed by the Government, now provides it with the
capability to cut local users off the global Internet while maintaining State-approved
domestic Internet traffic. 101 On 15 January, the Minister of Information and
Communications Technology confirmed in an interview that the National Information
Network allowed security agencies to monitor private accounts and to control national
search engines. 102 In November 2018, the Government proposed a new bill on the
“organization of social messengers”.103 If passed, the bill would increase the armed forces’
interference in and oversight of the Internet infrastructure, and introduce new offences
associated with the use of blocked online applications.
43. OHCHR has continued to receive reports of the arbitrary arrest, detention and
harassment of mainly Iranian journalists and media workers. Online threats and
intimidation of detained journalists, as well as the public disclosure of personal data
illegally retrieved from those detained, have been reported. The injunction against over 150
former and current staff members of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Persian
Service remains in place. In addition to the threats and defamatory statements targeted at
them, the impact of the investigation, the freezing of their assets and the threat of arrest
upon return to the Islamic Republic of Iran have had a significant negative impact upon
BBC Persian Service staff and their families.
93 See http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/780303.
94 See www.article19.org/resources/iran-review-of-the-publication-and-free-access-to-information-act-
2009/.
95 See www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Freedom-of-information-factsheet-ENG-1.pdf.
96 See www.iranhumanrights.org/2017/06/rouhani-government-closed-seven-million-websites/ and
www.isna.ir/news/96031608592/.
97 See https://rsf.org/en/news/iranian-court-imposes-total-ban-telegram.
98 See www.iranhumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/Closing-the-gates-3-online.pdf.
99 See https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-sci-tech/59911/iran-disables-more-unregistered-
sim-cards.
100 See http://bit.ly/2wCsbcT.
101 See www.iranhumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/EN-Guards-at-the-gate-High-quality.pdf.
102 See http://tn.ai/1628696.
103 See www.isna.ir/news/97082813960/.
Situation of human rights defenders and human rights lawyers
44. The Secretary-General remains deeply concerned about the situation of human rights
defenders and human rights lawyers imprisoned in connection with their activities. Since
the issuance of the previous report, Narges Mohammadi, Arash Sadeghi, Farhad Meysami,
Soheil Arabi and Mohammad Ali Taheri remain imprisoned, despite calls for their release.
Mr. Taheri, the founder of a spiritual movement, a writer and a practitioner of alternative
medicine theories, is detained while awaiting an appeal against his conviction and five-year
prison sentence for “spreading corruption on earth”. Mr. Taheri twice successfully appealed
against the death penalty on the same charge. The Secretary-General reiterates the call of
the previous United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in his statement of 5
August 2015, to “immediately withdraw the charges against Taheri and ensure his
unconditional release”.104
45. The Secretary-General reiterates concerns about the health of Mr. Sadeghi, who is in
need of urgent medical care after being returned to prison contrary to medical advice. The
Secretary-General is also concerned about the health of Dr. Meysami, a physician who
campaigned for an end to compulsory veiling. Dr. Meysami started a hunger strike in
August 2018 due to his conviction on charges related to his activism on women’s rights and
the lack of access to a lawyer of his choosing. The Secretary-General reiterates calls by
special procedure mandate holders to immediately release all those who have been
imprisoned for promoting and protecting the rights of women.105
46. The Secretary-General welcomes the release – although on conditional parole – of
prominent human rights lawyer Abdolfattah Soltani,106 and the release on bail of lawyer
Zeinab Taheri (while noting that she still faces several charges).107 The Secretary-General
remains concerned that the continued arrests and treatment of lawyers risk undermining the
right to an effective defence and the administration of justice. Nasrin Sotoudeh, a prominent
human rights lawyer, remains in prison. Her detention followed her representation of
women who had protested against compulsory veiling. In August 2018, Ms. Sotoudeh went
on a hunger strike in protest against the treatment of her and her family. The authorities laid
further charges against her and arrested her husband, Reza Khandan. Prior to his detention,
Mr. Khandan raised concerns about compulsory veiling and campaigned for his wife’s
release. The Secretary-General reiterates concerns about the arrest and detention of human
rights defenders and human rights lawyers in relation to their support for protests against
compulsory veiling.108
47. In its comments, the Government stated that all individuals, including those referred
to in the present report as human rights lawyers, human rights defenders, journalists or
environmentalists, were treated according to the law.
E. Rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association
Prohibition of independent trade unions
48. The Islamic Republic of Iran does not allow the creation of trade unions other than
government-sanctioned Islamic labour councils and is not a party to the International
Labour Organization (ILO) Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise
Convention, 1948 (No. 87) or to the ILO Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining
Convention, 1949 (No. 98). The prohibition of independent trade unions is contrary to the
obligations of the Islamic Republic of Iran under article 8 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. The reported harassment and detention of labour activists also violates
104 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16292&LangID=E.
105 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23947&LangID=E.
106 See www.irna.ir/fa/News/83108418 and www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/21/iranian-human-
rights-lawyer-abdolfattah-soltani-released-from-jail.
107 See www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/release-on-bail-of-zeinab-taheri.
108 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23947&LangID=E.
fundamental rights and freedoms – of expression, peaceful assembly and association, as
well as with regard to arbitrary detention.
49. The Secretary-General notes long-standing concerns related to the right to work and
labour rights, especially as they relate to the minimum wage, non-payment of wages, job
security, and restrictions on trade unions. In March 2018, the Supreme Labour Council
increased the minimum wage to 11.14 million rials per month.109 Workers’ groups and the
Deputy for Labour at the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labour and Social Welfare have stated
that the minimum wage needs to be between two and four times higher to cover the average
expenses of a family.110
Peaceful protests and strikes
50. The protests that took place in December 2017 and January 2018 have been reported
as the most significant demonstrations since 2009. Popular discontent is fuelled by
unaddressed grievances associated with falling living standards, economic and
environmental mismanagement and perceived corruption. These demonstrations, labour
strikes and other peaceful protests have occurred sporadically but consistently, mostly over
salaries and economic and environmental conditions.
51. The Government’s response to these protests is of increasing concern. According to
analysts,111 the 2018/19 budget allocation for the Law Enforcement Force, responsible for
internal security, increased by 84 per cent compared to the previous year. This constitutes
the highest growth rate in an allocation to a defence or security institution. The Head of the
Judiciary described the ongoing protests as “sedition” aimed at “dragging people to the
streets to target the very foundation of the Islamic Republic”.112
52. Non-payment of wages remains a serious concern; many cases highlight the extent
of this issue. Workers at the Haft Tapeh sugar mill have regularly complained of cuts to
wages or unpaid wages since the privatization of the mill in 2016. 113 Workers had
previously protested against the non-payment of over six months of wages since July 2017,
which were eventually paid in March 2018.114 In August 2018, workers were again left
unpaid, which led to strikes recommencing in November.115 After two weeks of protests,
according to public reports, the authorities arrested approximately 18 protesting workers
and labour activists at the mill.116 Twelve persons have since been released, while protests
calling for the release of the remaining detainees continued.117 The Governor of Khuzestan
was quoted in the local media as stating: “Workers have rights, we are looking into their
issues and demands.”118
53. Truck drivers have intermittently conducted strikes across many provinces since
May 2018 protesting against low wages. While industry officials stated that the demands
for higher wages were reasonable,119 other reports indicate that the authorities threatened
drivers with revocation of their driving licences if they did not cease protesting. The
109 See https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/83942/minimum-wages-in-iran-
to-rise-by-198 and www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/784016/.
110 See www.sharghdaily.ir/fa/Main/Detail/151699/, www.radiozamaneh.com/391473 and
www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1396/09/12/1590634/.
111 See www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2018/11/decode-iran-defence-spending.
112 See www.mizanonline.com/fa/news/472402.
113 See www.iranhumanrights.org/2017/07/iranian-sugar-plant-workers-detained-without-bail-after-
protesting-unpaid-wages-and-benefits/ and www.iranhumanrights.org/2018/02/30-sugar-plant-
workers-arrested-in-iran-for-striking-over-months-of-unpaid-salaries/.
114 See www.ituc-csi.org/iran-authorities-step-up-anti.
115 See www.tuc.org.uk/tuc-writes-iranian-ambassador-regarding-arrests-haft-tapeh-sugar-workers.
116 See https://apnews.com/5724c2ea6b7d4b85bd3f2ce015cc88dd, www.tuc.org.uk/tuc-writes-iranian-
ambassador-regarding-arrests-haft-tapeh-sugar-workers and www.ilna.ir/fa/tiny/news-693272.
117 See www.ilna.ir/fa/tiny/news-693844.
118 See https://apnews.com/5724c2ea6b7d4b85bd3f2ce015cc88dd.
119 See www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1397/03/02/1733559/.
authorities reportedly detained 150 truck driver protestors120 after they resumed their strike
in September. The Prosecutor-General further suggested that those involved could receive
the death penalty for “acting against national security”,121 and a court in Qazvin Province
requested the death penalty for 17 truck drivers arrested there.122 This led to truck drivers
recommencing their strikes in November.
54. Ten steel workers at the Iran National Steel Industrial Group in Ahvaz were detained
for several days after night-time raids in March for their involvement in a strike over wages
and work conditions.123 In June, “dozens” were reportedly arrested, claiming three months
of unpaid wages.124 The strike of steel workers resumed in November in the absence of a
response.125
55. Protests extended to the education sector, amidst reports indicating that teachers live
below the poverty line. 126 In May 2018, Mohammad Habibi, a member of the Iranian
Teachers’ Trade Association of Tehran, was arrested and convicted three months later on
national security-related charges. 127 He was sentenced to ten and a half years of
imprisonment and 74 lashes and was banned from political participation and travel.128 Mr.
Habibi has reportedly been denied medical care129 despite allegedly suffering continuous
pain from injuries caused by ill-treatment inflicted by the authorities during his arrest.130
Teachers across the Islamic Republic of Iran protested against low wages and underfunding
during a sit-in organized by the Council for Coordination among Teachers Unions, on 14
and 15 October 2018.131 A second round of protests was organized in mid-November, with
reports of teachers being detained or summoned to courts for their participation.132
The right to work of the Baha’i
56. Concerns relating to the right to work also affect minority groups, such as the Baha’i,
who have been prohibited from working in the public sector and many private
enterprises.133 In November 2017, several Baha’i-owned businesses were sealed and closed
by local authorities after they had temporarily closed during Baha’i holy days. 134 In
December 2017, the Special Assistant to the Iranian President for Civil Rights stated that
“inquiries have been made from the President’s legal deputy in relation to the sealing of
business premises and the prohibition of the activities of Baha’i. We will continue this
discussion through legal means until we find a solution for the matter.”135 While this is an
120 See www.itfglobal.org/en/news-events/press-releases/2018/october/itf-statement-on-iran-truckers-
strike/, www.ilna.ir/fa/tiny/news-673910 and www.ilna.ir/fa/tiny/news-673088.
121 Ibid.
122 See www.irna.ir/qazvin/fa/News/83058567.
123 See www.industriall-union.org/iran-10-detained-after-protests-over-unpaid-wages-of-4000-steel-
workers.
124 See www.hra-news.org/2018/hranews/a-15727/.
125 See www.iranhumanrights.org/2018/11/steel-and-sugarcane-workers-rally-in-ahvaz-to-demand-
unpaid-wages/.
126 See https://ei-ie.org/en/detail/16032/iran-solidarity-with-trade-union-leaders-arrested-after-
teachers%E2%80%99-
strike?fbclid=IwAR0C6PPsTFGTik7G_ESzHNmRN5rTiFvksnn0s0ezev1NOkAJbNTBGh1-VNc.
127 See www.hrw.org/news/2018/11/22/iran-mounting-crackdown-teachers-labor-activists.
128 Ibid.; and see www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde13/9179/2018/en/.
129 See www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/uaa17418.pdf.
130 See https://ei-ie.org/en/detail/15931/iran-teacher-trade-unionist-mohammed-habibi-sentenced-to-ten-
and-a-half-years-in-prison.
131 See https://ei-ie.org/en/detail/16032/iran-solidarity-with-trade-union-leaders-arrested-after-
teachers%E2%80%99-strike?fbclid=IwAR0C6PPsTFGTik7G_ESzHNmRN5rTiFvksnn0s
0ezev1NOkAJbNTBGh1-VNc.
132 See www.hrw.org/news/2018/11/22/iran-mounting-crackdown-teachers-labor-activists.
133 See A/71/374.
134 See www.iranhumanrights.org/2016/11/bahai-life-rights-karaj/ and http://iranpresswatch.org/post/
19787/bahai-businesses-shuttered-ongoing-persecution-campaign/.
135 See http://iranpresswatch.org/post/18522/shahindokht-molaverdi-written-communications-regarding-
forced-closure-bahai-owned-businesses/.
encouraging statement, no improvement has been noted with respect to the sealing and
closure of Baha’i shops.
F. Situation of women and girls
57. The Secretary-General welcomes the introduction to Parliament of the bill on
protection of women against violence. In addition to focusing on the protection of women
from abuse, the bill addresses rehabilitation and the interrogation of female offenders. The
Vice-President for Women and Family Affairs announced on 12 October 2018 that the bill
had been sent for review to religious scholars in Qom.136
58. The Secretary-General notes the adoption by Parliament, on 20 November 2018, of
the bill amending the Act on Determining the Nationality Status of Children Born to Iranian
Mothers and Foreign Fathers. The amendment allows these children to apply for Iranian
citizenship upon reaching the age of 18 provided their mothers have not done so on their
behalf or where their case is not linked to national security concerns. The Secretary-General
is encouraged by the ratification by Parliament, on 28 August 2018, of the bill on protection
of children and adolescents, 137 which is currently pending approval by the Guardian
Council. The Secretary-General remains concerned that the bill fails to clearly define the
minimum age for criminal responsibility, preventing consistent treatment by judges in cases
involving child offenders. In its comments, the Government stated that the purpose of the
law was to include conditions allowing the judge to impose alternative punishments.
59. Key indicators demonstrate positive efforts by the Government to provide education
to all Iranians. Figures from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) indicate the total enrolment and completion of primary education
for both boys and girls.138 The Office of the President announced in September 2018 that
the Council of Ministers had agreed that the Education Bill would include a provision
prohibiting discrimination in higher education.139 The Education Bill will reportedly end the
“starred students” policy,140 which identified, restricted and expelled from higher education
student activists and other persons that the intelligence services deemed to be in opposition
to the Government.141 The Secretary-General also urges the Islamic Republic of Iran to
extend the anti-discrimination provisions of the Education Bill to ethnic and religious
minorities. Many Baha’i are reportedly expelled from university or their applications are
rejected as “incomplete” once their religion is discovered. 142 Individuals who have
complained about their non-admission have reportedly been imprisoned.143 The Baluchis, as
well as Arab and Kurdish minorities, also face structural problems in accessing education,
such as a lack of official documentation or proof of citizenship,144 as well as the limited
number of schools in their region, the distances, and unaffordable transport costs.145
60. Civil law continues to deny women equal rights, including in marriage, divorce,
child custody and inheritance. Discrimination also prevails in accessing the job market,
despite major advances in women’s post-secondary education. In March 2018, the
Statistical Centre of the Islamic Republic of Iran reported that 41 per cent of women
136 See www.ilna.ir/fa/tiny/news-678900.
137 See https://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session20/IR/Iran2ndCycle.pdf.
138 See http://datatopics.worldbank.org/education/country/iran,-islamic-rep.
139 See http://president.ir/en/106036.
140 See www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=2018091818331121.
141 See www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/iranian-student-activists-denied-education/ and
www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/05/irans-student-activists-denied-education.
142 See https://iranhumanrights.org/2018/09/in-just-six-months-iranian-universities-expelled-50-bahai-
students-for-their-religious-beliefs/ and www.iranhumanrights.org/2018/05/you-know-what-your-
problem-is-young-man-expelled-from-iranian-university-for-his-bahai-faith/.
143 See www.iranhumanrights.org/2017/11/three-bahais-barred-from-university-in-iran-sentenced-to-
five-years-in-prison/.
144 See https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Rights-Denied-Violations-against-ethnic-
and-religious-minorities-in-Iran.pdf.
145 Ibid.
between the ages of 15 and 29 years were unemployed.146 ILO also expressed its concerns
in relation to persisting legal restrictions on women’s access to employment.147
61. The Secretary-General remains concerned that the legal age for marriage under the
Civil Code is 13 years for girls and 15 years for boys. Parliament agreed on 26 September
2018 to urgently consider a plan to amend article 1041 of the Civil Code148 to raise the legal
age for marriage to 16 years for girls and 18 years for boys. However, girls could still be
married as young as 13 with a court’s permission. According to reports by the National
Organization for Civil Registration, the marriage of 1,463 girls under the age of 15 was
registered during the last Persian year (March 2017–March 2018).
62. The Secretary-General is concerned by the ongoing repression of women in relation
to their objection to compulsory veiling and by the response of judicial authorities to
peaceful protests in that regard. Women who do not wear a hijab in public can be sentenced
to up to two months in prison or be fined. A number of female protestors have been arrested,
notably among those involved in the “My Stealthy Freedom” campaign online149 and some
of those who became known as the “Girls of Revolution Street”. According to information
received by OHCHR, while most were released on bail, some female protesters were
sentenced to up to two years in prison on the charge of “encouraging moral corruption”.
63. The Secretary-General is deeply concerned at the reported arrest and treatment of
women human rights defenders. Hoda Amid, a lawyer primarily representing vulnerable
women, was arrested in September 2018. Women human rights defenders Najmeh Vahedi
and Rezvaneh Mohammadi were also detained at this time. All three women were released
on bail in November, pending trial.150 Atena Daemi and Golrokh Iraee – other women
human rights defenders – remain detained, despite calls, including by human rights
organizations and the European Parliament, for their release.151
III. Cooperation with international human rights mechanisms and OHCHR
A. Cooperation with human rights treaty bodies
64. The Islamic Republic of Iran has ratified six core international human rights treaties
and is a signatory to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
the involvement of children in armed conflict. The Secretary-General welcomes the
cooperation of the Government with the treaty bodies. He encourages the Government to
submit periodic reports, including under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, which have been overdue since 2014 and 2013 respectively, and under the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which was due in May
2018.
146 See www.amar.org.ir/Portals/1/releases/LFS_Year_1396.pdf.
147 See www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_
617065.pdf.
148 See www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ir/ir009en.pdf.
149 See www.facebook.com/StealthyFreedom/.
150 See www.en-hrana.org/womens-rights-activist-hoda-amid-released-on-bail, www.en-
hrana.org/womens-rights-activist-najmeh-vahedi-released-on-bail and www.en-hrana.org/update-
womens-rights-activist-rezvaneh-mohammadi-transferred-to-evin-prison.
151 See www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/10/iran-jailed-rights-defender-ailing,
www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/03/iran-new-evidence-of-appalling-treatment-of-women-
human-rights-defenders-held-in-shahre-rey-prison/ and www.europarl.europa.eu/news/cs/press-
room/20180315IPR99813/release-and-urgent-medical-help-for-women-human-rights-defenders-in-
iran.
B. Cooperation with the universal periodic review
65. The Secretary-General welcomes the publication by the Government of its midterm
report under the universal periodic review, covering the period from April 2015 to
December 2016.152 The Secretary-General also encourages all relevant Iranian institutions
and stakeholders to engage with OHCHR in the third universal periodic review cycle,
scheduled for November 2019.
C. Cooperation with special procedures
66. The first report of the new Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Javaid Rehman, was presented to the General Assembly in
October 2018.153 The Secretary-General notes that the Human Rights Council renewed the
mandate of the Special Rapporteur in March 2018 (in its resolution 37/30), and welcomes
comments by the Government indicating that it intends to engage with the Special
Rapporteur in a constructive dialogue. The Secretary-General further encourages the
Government to invite the Special Rapporteur to visit the Islamic Republic of Iran. In 2018,
the special procedures of the Human Rights Council issued 14 communications regarding
the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, three of which were replied to
by the Government, and 17 public statements.
D. Cooperation with OHCHR
67. The Secretary-General welcomes the enhanced engagement and dialogue on human
rights by Iranian officials, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Permanent
Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office and other
international organizations in Geneva and members of the High Council for Human Rights.
The Executive Office of the Secretary-General and OHCHR have raised the situation of
child offenders at imminent risk of execution with the Government on a number of
occasions and seek to further engage with the Iranian authorities on child justice.
IV. Conclusions and recommendations
68. The overall situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran has been marked by the impact
of the economic and financial challenges on the enjoyment of a range of rights by Iranians.
As a result, many Iranians have faced difficulties in accessing work, food, water, health
care and other basic necessities, despite mitigating measures taken by the authorities to
address these difficulties. The combined effect of long-standing economic grievances and
the exacerbating impact of reinstated unilateral sanctions since August 2018 has led to
sporadic protests across the country. The authorities’ response has included both attempts at
reform, and repression primarily targeting human rights defenders and human rights
lawyers, labour rights activists, social media users and environmentalists. The application
of the death penalty, including to child offenders, has continued at a high rate, although the
number of executions has generally reduced since the implementation of the amendment to
the drug trafficking law. Cases of torture, arbitrary detention, and trials that failed to adhere
to international standards have continued to be reported, as has persistent discrimination
against women and members of ethnic and religious minorities.
69. On the basis of the observations and conclusions made in the present report,
the Secretary-General provides the recommendations below:
70. The Secretary-General urges the Government to abolish the mandatory death
penalty and to introduce a moratorium on its use; to prohibit the execution of child
offenders in all circumstances and to commute their sentences.
152 See https://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session20/IR/Iran2ndCycle.pdf.
153 A/73/398.
71. The Secretary-General urges the Government to ensure that international
standards and guarantees of due process and fair trial are met, notably by ensuring
that all defendants, including those accused of crimes against the internal and external
security of the State, are assured access to counsel of their choosing during the
preliminary investigative stage and all subsequent stages of the judicial process.
72. The Secretary-General urges the Government to repeal laws authorizing the
use of torture and ill-treatment as a form of punishment, and to ensure that prompt,
thorough and effective investigations are undertaken by independent and impartial
bodies into all deaths in custody and reports of torture or other ill-treatment and that
those responsible are held accountable.
73. The Secretary-General takes due note of the economic and financial challenges
facing the Islamic Republic of Iran and encourages the Government to take all
measures necessary to mitigate their effects and to meet its obligations under the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including on the
protection of vulnerable groups. The Secretary-General urges the Government to
facilitate trade in medicines and other essential humanitarian items.
74. The Secretary-General urges the Government to ensure that human rights
defenders, human rights lawyers, journalists and environmentalists can perform their
roles safely and freely, without fear of harassment, arrest, detention and prosecution,
and to release all those detained for legitimately and peacefully exercising their rights
to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly.
75. The Secretary-General urges the Government to repeal laws that criminalize or
unduly restrict freedom of expression online, to ensure that online content is only
restricted pursuant to a decision by an independent and impartial judicial authority in
accordance with due process and to revoke decisions that enable the monitoring or
filtering of content and that are inconsistent with the right to privacy.
76. The Secretary-General urges the Government to take further practical steps to
eliminate all forms of discrimination against women and girls, in accordance with
international standards, and to ensure that the rights of women human rights
defenders and human rights lawyers are protected.
77. The Secretary-General urges the Government to protect the rights of all
persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities and to address all forms of
discrimination against them, and to immediately and unconditionally release all those
imprisoned for exercising their right to freedom of religion or belief.
78. The Secretary-General calls upon the Government to ratify the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.
79. The Secretary-General welcomes the engagement of the Islamic Republic of
Iran with the human rights treaty bodies and calls upon the Government to follow up
on the concluding observations of all treaty bodies and recommendations of special
procedures, and to engage in a dialogue and cooperate with the Special Rapporteur on
the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
80. The Secretary-General encourages the Government to continue its increasing
constructive engagement with OHCHR in following up on all recommendations made
in the previous and present reports, and those of international human rights
mechanisms, including the universal periodic review.